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Three types of nominal anaphors are investigated: (i) pronouns, (ii) partitive
ellipsis and (iii) the contrastive anaphor ‘one’.
I argue that in each case, the representational basis for anaphora is the same,
a semantic variable ranging over singular or plural entities, rather than syntactic as
previous approaches have suggested.
In the case of pronouns, I argue against syntactic D-type approaches (Elbourne
2005) and semantic D-type approaches (Cooper 1979). Instead, I present arguments
in favor of the set variable representation assumed under Nouwen (2003)’s approach.
Following this, I consider a number of cases usually taken to involve the elision of a
noun phrase, and argue that instead they involve the deletion of a partitive phrase
containing an anaphoric plural pronoun. Third, I turn to the contrastive anaphor
‘one’ and its null counterpart in French. Here again, I argue that the basis for
anaphora is a semantic set variable, where this anaphor differs from pronouns in
being of category N rather than D, and in having a pragmatic requirement for
contrast. This analysis differs from previous ones which hold that this expression
is a syntactic substitute of category N′, or the spell-out of the head of a number
phrase followed by ellipsis of a noun phrase.
Finally, I discuss the phenomenon of event anaphora. Given the phenomenon’s
interaction with the anaphors discussed prior in this dissertation, I argue that it is
better seen as a case of deferred reference to an event on the basis of anaphoric
reference to a discourse segment, following Webber (1991). This contrasts with
what I call metaphysical approaches, which hold that the anaphor directly resumes
an event introduced to the context by a previous clause (Asher 1993; Moltmann
1997).
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“Often [...] the mere wording [of a sentence],” wrote Frege (1918:64), “does not
suffice for the expression of the thought.” For Frege, a “thought” is the “sense” of
a sentence, and the only sort of thing that is true or false. The cases Frege has in
mind include sentences with pronouns, such as (1).
(1) They sat down.
The pronoun itself says nothing about what things it stands for. Thus the “mere
wording” of (1) does not suffice to express something that may be true or false. For
Frege this means it does not suffice to express a thought. We need in addition some
contribution of context. “[T]he knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the
utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to
grasp the thought correctly” (ibid). The context may include preceding parts of
the discourse, or their effects. In conjunction with the context following (2), for
example, a sentence like (1) may be used to express the thought that the dogs sat
down. Because the dogs are mentioned in prior discourse, the pronoun is called
1
anaphoric.
(2) The dogs walked in.
The question since Frege has been, how exactly does the context complete the
“expression of the thought”? Is there a satisfactory way of delivering on what
we might call Frege’s Promise, the promise that context will somehow complete
the “expression of the thought” when the “mere wording” does not suffice? In this
dissertation I consider this question with respect to third-person anaphoric pronouns
in particular,1 and also cases like (3), with the noun one, and (4), with apparent
noun ellipsis.
(3) The tall ones sat down.
(4) Many sat down.
I discuss the choice between two ways of responding to Frege’s Promise for anaphoric
pronouns, which I will call the reference-anaphoric and sense-anaphoric approaches.2
The reference-anaphoric approach to pronouns is the contemporary standard.
It says that the context assigns a referent to the pronoun, but does not assign it a
sense. In the terms of Neale 1990, it assigns the pronoun a value but not a meaning,
something which restricts the values of its uses. Relative to the context following
(2), for example, the referent of they may be the dogs. But the pronoun itself
1I will not discuss first- or second-person pronouns, or any issues pertaining to de se uses of
pronouns (see for instance Lewis 1979, Anand 2006).
2These terms allude to the common distinction between identity-of-reference anaphora and
identity-of-sense anaphora (Carlson 2006). But they do no make exactly the same cut.
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still has no sense, no semantic property that determines its referent. Formally it is
represented as a free variable ranging over individuals in the domain of discourse.
As a response to Frege’s Promise, this is analogous to Kripke’s (1972) response
to Frege’s view of proper names. Frege assumed that proper names have a sense,
something which determines their referent. Kripke argued that names do not have
a Fregean sense, but rather have their referent given directly by the context, or the
world of evaluation.
The sense-anaphoric approach is these days a competitor to the standard, but
one that echoes traditional ideas. It says that the context assigns the pronoun a
sense, which in turn determines a referent. Relative to the context following (2),
for example, the sense of they may be identical to the sense of the dogs. As a
consequence, the two noun phrases have the same referent, namely the dogs. This
resonates with a traditional notion of anaphora, whereby the pronoun inherits the
meaning of its antecedent. It also comports with the Fregean view of names, whereby
names have individuals as referents, but also have a sense which determines their
referents.
In this dissertation I defend the reference-anaphoric approach against a con-
temporary version of the sense-anaphoric approach, the “d-type” theory of pronouns.
This theory says that a pronoun is a definite description whose restriction (or ma-
trix) is determined anaphorically. Thus they in (1) means ‘the φ’s’, where φ is a
noun-sense given by context. There are two important variants of how context gives
φ, called the syntactic and semantic d-type theories. The syntactic d-type says a
pronoun is a description with a silenced NP restriction, whose silencing is licensed in
3
relation to an antecedent NP. The noun-sense φ is the sense of this NP. The semantic
d-type theory says that a pronoun is a description with no noun in it, but whose
meaning includes a free variable φ over noun meanings. In the coming chapters I
will argue that neither variant of the d-type theory is better than the reference-
anaphoric approach to pronouns. The context sets the referent of a pronoun, but
does not give it a sense, either by supplying a noun-meaning or by supplying a noun.
While the reference-anaphoric approach to pronouns is standard, it is not
commonly applied to one anaphora or NP ellipsis, as in (3) and (4). It is therefore a
novel aspect of my thesis that this approach applies here as well. Following (2), for
example, what the context assigns to ones in (3) is not the NP dogs or its meaning.
It simply assigns it a referent, just as it does for they in (1), namely the dogs. I
make the same claim about the apparent ellipsis site in (4).
1.1 Reference-anaphoric vs. Sense-anaphoric
The reference-anaphoric approach initially seems attractive, since in isolation a pro-
noun clearly has no sense or meaning. Modulo the presuppositions associated with
number and gender, the pronoun itself does not express any concept under which
all of its referents will fall. But our question is not about pronouns in isolation. It
is about how pronouns function in context. And there are contexts which initially
seem to favor the sense-anaphoric approach. Two well-known cases are represented
by (5).3
3These specific examples are due to Cooper (1979).
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(5) a. Pronouns of laziness: This year the president is a democrat. Come
next election, he will be a republican.
b. Paycheck pronouns: The man who gave his paycheck to his wife
was wiser than the one who gave it to his mistress.
In (5a), we find a classic example of what is known as pronouns of laziness4; and
in (5b) an example of paycheck pronouns. What is interesting about such cases
is that some pronouns of laziness, and all paycheck pronouns, do not refer back
to an entity introduced in prior discourse or context. Rather, they introduce new
entities, entities which meet the same description as their antecedents. In (5a),
what the pronoun is intended to refer to is not the current president, who is an
asserted democrat, but rather the future president, who will be a republican. In
(5b), the check given to one’s mistress is not the one given to the other’s wife.
Given that such anaphoric pronouns introduce new entities, Elbourne (2005) dubs
them neontological pronouns and offers them as a serious challenge to what I call
reference-anaphoric approaches.5 Sense-anaphoric approaches, D-type theories, he
argues, are much better suited to account for such cases.
4The term pronoun of laziness is due to Geach (1962) who uses it for any pronoun which can
be replaced by its antecedent.
5Crucially, neontological pronouns do not subsume the class of pronouns of laziness, given that
some pronouns of laziness do not introduce new entities. Consider the following from Geach (1962):
i. Smith broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he has recently died a pauper.
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The edge of sense-anaphoric approaches can be made clear by using para-
phrases of the examples where the relevant descriptions are supplied for the anaphoric
pronouns. Consider the following:
(6) a. This year the president is a democrat. Come next election, the pres-
ident will be a republican.
b. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one
who gave his paycheck to his mistress.
Here, the paraphrases of the cases in (5) involving overt descriptions appear equiv-
alent to the original cases involving pronouns. This is readily accounted for under
sense-anaphoric approaches, but not so under reference-anaphoric approaches.
Other anaphoric pronouns pose problems for simple versions of both the reference-
anaphoric and sense anaphoric approaches. Here, I have in mind the well-known
donkey pronouns:
(7) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
The issue here is to capture the co-variation between the pronouns and their an-
tecedents in such contexts. They have led advocates of either approaches to develop
refined notions of local contexts which affect the resolution of anaphoric pronouns.
For the reference-anaphoric approaches, the issue arises from the fact that the
covariation cannot readily be captured through typical grammatical means such as
binding or co-indexation. Co-indexation would not yield a co-varying reading of
6
the dependency, but rather reference to a single donkey; a possible reading, but not
the problematic one. Syntactic binding is not possible, due to the fact that the
antecedent does not c-command the pronoun. Further, the antecedent could not
be ‘moved’ to a syntactic position where it could bind a pronoun, as it appears in
environments which are traditionally taken to be ‘islands’ to movement (Ross 1967).
For the sense anaphoric approaches, which take the pronouns to stand for
definite descriptions, a similar issue comes up. It is well known that singular definite
descriptions typically presuppose both the existence and the uniqueness of their
referent. How is it then that the cases in (24), and their counterparts involving
descriptions in (8), do not presuppose a unique donkey in the discourse context?
(8) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey.
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats the donkey.
The difficulties emerging from such cases have motivated different families
of theories pertaining to anaphoric pronoun resolution. On the one hand, dy-
namic theories fall under the reference-anaphoric approach. Under such theories,
pronouns are treated as variables resuming discourse referents, (9), and the lifes-
pan of such discourse referents is determined by the effect that expressions such as
quantifiers and modal operators have on the discourse structure, or the assignment
sequences.
(9) Standard/Dynamic
J it K = X
7
The second family of theories, D-type theories, fall under the sense-anaphoric
approach. Under such theories, the pronoun is treated as a definite description which
anaphorically resumes the sense of its antecedent, a noun phrase meaning. The prob-
lem of uniqueness is dealt with by having quantificational expressions quantify over
fine grained situations, instead of individuals. And so each donkey is taken to be
unique in its relative situation. I come back to this issue in more detail in chapter
2.















Both types of dynamic theories assume the reference-anaphoric approach to
anaphoric pronoun representation. The difference mainly comes from what is ma-
nipulated by operators, and their effects in context.
D-type theories, sense-anaphoric approaches, branch off in two different types
of treatments of pronoun representation, namely semantic and syntactic.
Under semantic approaches, the pronoun has the meaning of a definite de-
scription, but the descriptive content, the noun meaning, is missing. The missing
sense is obtained from the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun. The interpretation
8
of such anaphoric pronouns, in its simplest form, is that found in (11a), and the
relation holding between the anaphor and its antecedent is represented in (11b).
(11) Semantic D-type
a. J it K = ιx.X(x)
b.
Turning to syntactic sense anaphora, or syntactic D-type, there pronouns are
treated as standing for covert definite descriptions. The pronouns have both the
syntax and semantics of definite determiners, but the noun phrase has been elided
under identity with an overt antecedent NP, to be recovered by the hearer. The
more complex syntactic representation assumed is the one in (12a), and the relation
between the elided NP and the antecedent is represented in (12b).
(12) Syntactic D-type
a. [DP it [NP donkey] ]
b.
The main motivation for this syntactic approach is what is now known as the
problem of the formal link (Kadmon 1987), exemplified by the following pair:
(13) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. * Every heterosexual monogamous married man is sitting next to her.
9
Assuming co-intensional restrictions for the quantifier every in the two sentences,
the issue is to explain the failure of anaphora in (13b). The issue is straightforward
for the dynamic versions of the reference-anaphoric approach: no relevant discourse
referents have been introduced, which could be resumed, in (13b), whereas one was
introduced in (13a).
The upshot of the syntactic approach, over the semantic D-type approach, is
that ellipsis is typically taken to be licensed under certain conditions, such as the
overt presence of an antecedent, as stated in (14).
(14) NPE Licensing Condition6
A formally identical linguistic antecedent to the elided NP must be available
in the surrounding discourse.
This condition thus allows the syntactic approach to account for the contrast in
(13).
Thus while the sense-anaphoric approach has some appeal, it also meets some
challenges that receive a better account under the reference-anaphoric approach.
Furthermore, turning to cases which usually go under the heading of noun phrase
ellipsis (NPE) and noun substitution (NS), which, on the surface, appear as the
archetypes of sense-anaphora, it is not clear that such approaches are in fact suitable
for even these phenomena. In fact, I argue below that there as well, a reference-
anaphoric approach is better.
6This is a paraphrase of Elbourne 2005: 44.
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1.1.1 Issues for Sense Anaphora
Here I give a brief summary of the arguments to be presented below in chapter 2,
and further developed for partitive ellipsis and contrastive anaphora in the subse-
quent chapters.
First, the syntactic d-type approach both overgenerates and undergenerates,
on the account that the condition on NPE assumed is neither necessary nor sufficient
for the licensing of anaphoric pronouns.
This can be seen in cases where the formal presence of an antecedent noun is
not sufficient to warrant anaphora. Cases such as those in (15), where nouns are
modified by privative modifiers, are a good example of this.
(15) a. If a child has a fake diamond and visits a jeweler, he thinks that
{#[ they diamonds]/[the diamonds]} are prettier than [ his fake
diamond].
b. Every citizen who meets a former president wants #[him presi-
dent]/[the president] to lower taxes.
This is also exemplified by cases involving non-referential antecedents, some of which
are within anaphoric islands, in the sense of Postal 1969.
(16) a. # Speaking of the successor-function, every number is smaller than it
successor. (Heim 1990: 167)
b. # Every guitar player brought it guitar to the party.
Here again, the formal presence of the noun is not enough.
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The syntactic approach also fails in cases of neontological pronouns where
no overt antecedent is present. Consider the case of event anaphora in a donkey
configuration in (17).
(17) Whenever Michael visited the other Bluths, it was a disaster.
Furthermore, as I will discuss below, modifying the constraint on NPE is not an
option, given that NPE is more constrained than pronouns with respect to event
anaphora:
(18) a. My sister got mugged in College Park last week, and it happened to
my brother this week.
b. My sister got mugged in College Park last week *(, and some/few/several/one
?mugging? happened to my brother this week).
Finally, I will present a number of arguments against sense-anaphoric ap-
proaches altogether, but let me introduce one such argument here. The reach of
plural pronouns in contexts involving several discourse referents is simply not that
of definite descriptions:
(19) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [They] sat down.
Can refer to Z, or X ∪ Y ∪ Z
Cannot refer to X ∪ Z
12
c. [The boys] sat down.
Can refer to X ∪ Z
Rather, such cases point to a more traditional account, where, without any further
qualifications, only the most recently introduced or most salient discourse referent
is accessible to the anaphor.
Perhaps more surprisingly, cases which are usually treated as involving NPE
or NS, ideal candidates for a sense-anaphoric approach, also behave like anaphoric
plural pronouns in such cases. Consider the cases in (20) and (21).
(20) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
[Many ] sat down.
b. Can mean [Many Z], or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
c. = Many of them sat down.
Can mean [Many Z], or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
d. 6= Many boys sat down.
Can only mean [Many X ∪ Z]
(21) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
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[The tall ones] sat down.
b. Can mean ‘the tall Zs’, or ‘the tall X ∪ Y ∪ Zs’
Cannot mean ‘the tall X ∪ Zs’
c. [The tall boys] sat down.
Can mean ‘the tall X ∪ Z’
Cannot mean ‘the tall Zs’.
This type of evidence will be in part my motivation for a departure from the
sense-anaphoric approaches, even in these unexpected cases, and argue in favor of a
reference-anaphoric approach in the cases discussed.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
In chapter 2, I discuss the representation of pronouns. I will argue against both
the syntactic and semantic representation of this type of anaphors as proposed
under D-type theories. Instead, I present a number of arguments which favor a
reference-anaphoric approach to pronouns. This account will be the foundation for
the treatment of the nominal anaphors discussed in the following chapters.
In chapter 3, I discuss a number of cases traditionally analyzed as involving
noun phrase ellipsis. There I argue for a different treatment, also involving ellipsis,
but of a partitive phrase, where the anaphoric component of the expression is a
plural pronoun embedded in the deleted partitive.
In chapter 4, I turn to a third nominal anaphor, one. I analyze it as a nominal
head, with the same reference-anaphoric representation as anaphoric pronouns of
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category D. This contrasts with most approaches to this expression, which analyze
it as an N′ substitute or the spell-out of the head of a number phrase projection
followed by noun phrase ellipsis.
In chapter 5, I discuss a puzzle pertaining to event anaphora. As will be dis-
cussed throughout the preceding chapters, event anaphora is interesting in that it is
only possible with singular pronouns and demonstratives. Neither plural pronouns,
partitive ellipsis nor one-anaphora can resume an event implied by a previous sen-
tence. In this chapter, I will discuss two different approaches to this peculiar state
of affairs, and settle on an account of event anaphora originally proposed by Web-
ber (1991), which allows us to explain this restriction on singular anaphora. I will
further bring new data from French to help adjudicate on this issue.
Finally, in chapter 6 I conclude briefly, summarizing the proposals and argu-




In this chapter, I consider the interpretation and the syntactic representation of
anaphoric pronouns.
As mentioned in the introduction, I argue in favor of the reference-anaphoric
approach, where the pronoun is a variable over discourse referents, entities available
in the context or assignment sequence:
(22) Johnb walks in the park. Heb sings.
This treatment of pronouns can also readily apply to pronouns c-commanded by
their antecedent, e.g. bound pronouns.
(23) Johni/Every boyi thinks that hei is the best singer.
However, as originally pointed out by Geach (1962), such an analysis runs afoul
of a number of cases involving pronouns covarying with quantificational antecedents
in configurations where syntactic binding is impossible: the famous cases of donkey
anaphora.
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(24) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
Two major approaches have been taken in resolving this issue: D-type analyses and
dynamic analyses.
The D-type analyses propose a modification of the syntactic or semantic rep-
resentation of the pronoun, where it is anaphoric to a description and interpreted as
a definite description (such as the donkey in this case). In most modern versions of
this approach, the domain in which this type of anaphora is possible is taken to be
semantically restricted, for instance through the situation semantic interpretation
of quantificational expressions.
Dynamic analyses treat pronouns in such configurations on par with syntac-
tically bound pronouns and anaphoric pronouns across sentences, as variables over
discourse referents; the semantic of quantificational expressions is modified to ex-
tend the reach of so-called semantic binding. There, the possible anaphoric relations
are restricted to the possible semantic binding relations.
In this chapter, I will provide a number of arguments against D-type analyses,
and present a number of examples which are compatible with treating anaphoric
pronouns as variables which take salient referents as their value.
The chapter is structured as follows, in §2.1 I offer an overview of the distri-
bution of anaphoric pronouns, and the challenges met by unification theories. In
§2.2, I discuss two kinds of D-type analyses, syntactic and semantic, and offer argu-
ments against both. The arguments against the syntactic approaches are based on
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the phenomena of event anaphora, deep anaphora, and singular pronouns with split
antecedents. The arguments against the semantic approaches are based on patterns
involving plural pronouns in contexts involving several possible antecedents, and
the failure of descriptions to antecede pronouns when they serve as predicates, or as
the subject of a specificational sentence. In §2.3, I discuss dynamic theories, which
adopt the type of reference-anaphoric representation I favor, and then turn to my
proposed treatment in §2.5.
2.1 What We Can Do with Them
Offering a unified account of the interpretation of pronouns is a daunting task. This
is in great part due to the many distinct uses of pronouns.
First, there are the run-of-the-mill cases of deictic pronouns and bound pro-
nouns:
(25) a. [Referring to an individual with sufficient contextual
salience:]
Hei is Bob Loblaw. (deictic pronoun)
b. Every linguisti thinks hei is intelligent. (bound pronoun)
Such cases readily lend themselves to the reference-anaphoric representation of the
standard theory. In (25a), The pronoun is a variable resolved in context as the
individual demonstrated, namely Bob Loblaw. In (25b), the pronoun stands for a
variable bound by the quantificational expression every linguist, in the way variables
are bound in a predicate calculus.
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Next, we have pronouns which are more problematic for the standard theory.
These pronouns cannot readily be interpreted as variables taking a constant reading
in context, as they either covary with a quantificational expression which does not
c-command them, (26a), or because they seemingly take from their ‘antecedents’ not
the referent, but the description of the referent (26b,c). The latter class of pronouns
has been called neontological by Elbourne 2005.
(26) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. (donkey pronoun)
b. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one
who gave it to his mistress. (paycheck pronoun)
c. This year the president is a democrat. Come next election, he will be
a republican. (pronoun of laziness)
Then, a number of examples involve pronouns covarying with an antecedent
expression across a sentence boundary. These, in Craige Roberts’s (1987) terms, are
cases of telescoping, and, under her dynamic analysis, involve either quantificational
or modal subordination:
(27) a. Most books contain a table of contents. In some, it is at the end.
(anaphoric pronoun with ‘quantificational subordination’ )
b. John thinks that he will catch a fish. He hopes I will grill it tonight.
(anaphoric pronoun with ‘modal subordination’ )
Finally, there are a number of cases which introduce further complications to
our theories, as what exactly should be considered the ‘antecedent’ to the pronoun
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in such cases is not immediately clear. Those are the cases of event anaphora, deep
anaphora, and singular pronouns with split antecedents. I will discuss these cases
further below upon arguing against D-type analyses.
(28) a. John was shot on the street in broad daylight in NYC. It would have
never happened to Marie in Paris. (event anaphora)
b. [Waving a travel form to a university employee:]
Where do people usually submit it? (deep anaphoric pronoun)
c. Whenever Mary sees a horse or a donkey, she waves at it. (anaphoric
pronoun with split antecedents)
In semantics, there have been many attempts to capture these diverse uses of
pronouns under one analysis, one representation, with theories typically falling in
either of two camps: that of Dynamic Approaches (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982; Groe-
nendijk and Stockhof 1991; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Nouwen 2003; Brasoveanu 2006;
Schlenker 2010, 2011, Geurts 2011), or that of Description Theoretic Approaches
(Evans 1977, 1980; Cooper 1975, 1979; Sommers 1982; Neale 1987, 1990; Heim
1990; Elbourne 2005).1
The next section focuses on Description Theoretic Approaches. This family of
theories draws from the great likeness in semantical and anaphoric behavior holding
between pronouns and definite descriptions. Advocates of such approaches typically
take anaphoric pronouns to be anaphoric to descriptions, and to have the semantics
1In this work we will avoid addressing mixed approaches like those of Berman (1987) and
Kadmon (1987) altogether, which would take us too far afield. Rather, we will adopt the perspective
that a simpler monolithic theory would be preferable.
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of either Russellian or Fregean definite descriptions, with some work advocating
quantification over fine-grained situations or events.
For instance, the sentences with full-fledged definite descriptions corresponding
to those just mentioned are the following:2
(29) a. [Referring to an individual with sufficient contextual
salience:]
The man over there is Bob Loblaw. (akin to deictic pronouns)
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey. (akin to donkey
pronouns)
c. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one
who gave the paycheck to his mistress. (akin to paycheck pronouns)
d. This year the president is a democrat. Come next election, the pres-
ident will be a republican. (akin to pronouns of laziness)
e. Most books contain a table of contents. In some, the table of con-
tents is at the end. (akin to anaphoric pronouns with ‘quantificational
subordination’ )
f. John thinks that he will catch a fish, and he hopes I will grill the fish
2The example involving a definite description which corresponds to that involving a bound
pronouns is somewhat degraded (and usually ruled out under Condition C of the Binding Theory):
ii. ?Every linguisti thinks the linguisti is intelligent.
It seems to me that a fully unified description theoretic account is impossible for such cases. A
proper analogue definite description to the event anaphor is also hard to come by. I discuss these
cases in more detail below.
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tonight. (akin to anaphoric pronouns with ‘modal subordination’ )
(30) a. Waving a travel form to a university employee:
Where do people usually submit the travel form? (akin to deep
anaphoric pronouns)3
b. Whenever Mary sees a horse or a donkey, she waves at the horse or
donkey. (akin to anaphoric pronouns with split antecedents)
These examples of course only bolster the initial plausibility of the D-type analyses.
I come back to this in more details below.
Another concern that theories of pronominal anaphora must further address
is the so-called problem of the formal link (Kadmon 1987):
(31) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. * Every heterosexual monogamous married man is sitting next to her.
Given this minimal pair, where the content of the sentences is taken to be truth-
conditionally equivalent, we are led to ask in what way the linguistic or discourse
contribution of the phrases every man who has a wife and every heterosexual monog-
amous married man differ such that one apparently licenses subsequent anaphoric
uses of the pronoun her whereas the other one does not.
The problem has gained its name through the usual type of answers given
to the question it raises; namely that what differs between the two examples is a
3Deep anaphors are pragmatically controlled, their antecedents are resolved contextually. This
contrasts with surface anaphors which require a formal (overtly expressed) antecedent (Hankamer
and Sag 1976).
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necessary formal link between an anaphoric pronoun and its antecedent (taken to
be made possible in (31a) through the presence of the embedded indefinite a wife,
which is lacking in (31b)).
However, such a resolution to the problem posed by the pair in (31) runs
afoul of the cases found in (28) where no antecedent (or no obvious syntactically
or semantically defined unique antecedent) is present, which could be linked to the
anaphoric pronoun.
In the next section, I introduce the description theoretic approach to the vari-
ous pronoun uses discussed here. I argue that a syntactic D-type theory of pronouns,
as articulated in Elbourne (2005, 2008), is inadequate when addressing the issues
raised by cases such as (28) and (31).
Following this, I discuss how a semantic D-type approach could handle the
hurdles I present to its syntactic counterpart. Given that such theories are typically
taken to struggle with the negative fact in (31b), I will address the tension holding
between accounting both for such cases and those found in (28). However, I will
argue that, in the end, even the less restricted semantic D-type theories are met with
serious problems. As we will see, the pronominal representation offered by D-type
theories leads to various cases of overgeneration which cannot clearly be avoided by
appealing to semantic mechanisms such as quantification over situations.
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2.2 Description Theoretic Approaches
This section introduces some of the main justifications for the adoption of a descrip-
tion theoretic account of pronouns. In doing so, I describe the syntactic account of
Elbourne (2005), which offers the following syntax and semantics for pronouns:
(32) Syntactic D-type Pronouns
a. Syntax: [[ it i ] NP ]
b. Semantics: λi〈e,t〉.λg〈e,t〉. ∃!x(i(x) = 1 & g(x) = 1). ιx.(i(x) = 1 &
g(x) = 1)
After discussing the specifics of Elbourne’s theory, and its application to the
pronoun uses mentioned in (25) above, I turn to the cases mentioned in (28), which
prove problematic for the account.
2.2.1 Syntactic D-Type Account
The meaning of pronominal expressions can covary with that of quantificational
expressions:
(33) a. Every man beats his donkey.
b. [∀x : Man(x)]. [∃y : Donkey(y) ∧Own(x, y)]. Beat(x, y)
The sentence in (33a) allows for a distributive reading, (33b), where we conceive of
a potential plurality of donkeys, each one owned by one of the men considered, and
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where each of the men can be said to possess a donkey which he beats.4
In the simplest-seeming cases of covariation, the pronoun stands in the struc-
tural relation of c-command (Reinhart 1976, and many more)5 with the expression
it co-varies with, and the covariation can be captured by means of binding of the
pronoun, construed as a variable, by the quantificational expression. (34a) is the
LF assumed by Heim and Kratzer (1998) for the sentence in (33), and (34b) is the
function, in lambda notation, taken to be the external argument of the QP every
man:
(34) a. [every man] [αλ1 t1 beats his1 donkey]
b. λx.x beats x’s donkey
However, as mentioned above, a puzzling case for such a view is that of donkey-
sentences, which have covarying readings such as (35b):
(35) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
b. ∀x∀y(( man(x)∧ donkey(y)∧ owns(x, y))→ beats(x, y))
The problem here being that the antecedent a donkey to the pronoun it does not
stand in the c-command relation to the latter, and so cannot syntactically bind it
4A maximal reading of the expression his donkey is typically taken to obtain, where without
proper contextual restrictions, we usually take such a sentence to claim that every man beats each
and every one of his donkeys. This reading is not captured by (33b). Such readings are a driving
force of description theoretic approaches, but can also prove problematic (see for instance Neale
1990; Elbourne 2005).
5A phrase α c-commands a phrase β if and only if the first branching node dominating α also
dominates β (and neither α nor β dominates the other).
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(given a notion of binding as structurally governed).
Allowing the indefinite to scope out of the relative clause (RC) where it is gen-
erated will not help either; (i) since Ross (1967), it is assumed that such movement
is forbidden, as it constitutes an island violation, (ii) and raising the indefinite above
the universal quantifier would not give satisfactory truth conditions, as it would lead
to a reading involving a single donkey beaten by all of its owners (a possible reading
of the sentence, but not the most salient), to the expense of a reading involving a
possible plurality of donkeys (the most salient reading of the sentence).
This problematic case has instigated both lines of attack on the theoretical
analysis of pronouns introduced above. The strategy of the dynamic approaches
has been to modify the notion of semantic binding taken to be at work in examples
like (34a), such that it extends to cases such as (35a). Descriptive approaches,
on the other hand, target the representation of the pronoun itself, treating it as
involving anaphora to a contextually salient predicate, and as having the semantics
of a (Russellian or Fregean) definite description.
Two major subtypes of description theoretic accounts can be identified; E-
type (Evans 1977, 1980; Sommers 1982) and D-type (Cooper 1975, 1979; Neale
1987, 1990; Heim 1990; Elbourne 2005, 2008).
Both approaches contend that, in a number of cases seen above as well as in
the donkey cases, pronouns stand proxy for definite descriptions:6
6With the difference that E-type approaches treat pronouns as rigid designators, whereas D-
Type approaches allow for pronouns to yield ‘object-independent propositions’. We refer the reader
to Evans (1977, 1980), Sommers (1982), Soames (1987), and Neale (1990) for more discussion of
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(36) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey
Advocates of D-type approaches (Cooper 1975, 1979; Heim 1990; Neale 1990;
Heim and Kratzer 1998; Elbourne 2005, 2008) hold that pronouns can involve a
meaning component anaphoric to contextually salient predicates. This is how the
meaning of donkey is introduced to the meaning of the pronoun. Elbourne (2005)
identifies two subtypes of D-type theories; theories where pronouns are interpreted
as definite descriptions without a full-fledged DP syntax (semantic D-Type), and
those claiming that their syntax (and, by necessity, their semantic) is parallel to
that of their definite description counterpart (syntactic D-Type).
Elbourne’s theory falls in the syntactic D-type category, where he argues that
one of the advantages of this approach is that it accounts readily for the formal link
generalization, as it requires a formally syntactic antecedent. We come back to this
aspect in much more detail.
Elbourne further proposes that not only pronouns and definite descriptions
share a syntax (and most of their semantics); but also that proper names and traces7
this issue.
7After a modified application of Fox (2002)’s trace conversion operation:
iii. 1. Variable Insertion: Det Pred ⇒ Det [Pred λy.y = x]
2. Determiner Replacement: Det [Pred λy.y = x] ⇒ the [Pred λy.y = x]
This of course applies under a system which adopts the copy theory conception of traces, as
in the minimalist program (Chomsky 1995). Elbourne offers as a modification that the determiner
be replaced by [the i] instead of a covert definite determiner alone.
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do as well. The proposal seeks, in essence, to unify as much as possible the syntax
and semantics of expressions of type 〈e〉 (or referring expressions, abstracting away
from traces) :
(37) a. 1. Syntax
i. Pronouns: [[ it i ] NP ]
ii. Definite Descriptions: [[ the i ] NP ]
iii. Proper Names: [[ the i ] Socrates ]
iv. Traces: [[ the i ] NP ]
b. Semantics
λi〈e,t〉.λg〈e,t〉.∃!x(i(x) = 1 & g(x) = 1). ιx.(i(x) = 1&g(x) = 1)
Here, all of these expressions are taken to involve an overt or a covert definite
determiner8 which requires two arguments of type 〈e, t〉: namely an index-function
as internal argument9, and a typical nominal-function as external argument, and
then returns an entity of type 〈e〉.
Focusing on pronouns, Elbourne proposes that in a number of cases they are
accompanied by an elided NP, such as the ones generally assumed for cases like (38):
(38) a. John’s book is more interesting than Mary’s book.
b. Bill ate smarties all afternoon, and Georges ate some smarties through-
out the evening.
8The pronoun being identified as a type of definite determiner, modulo considerations of its
φ-features.
9We will come back to Elbourne’s notion of index later on in this section.
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c. Suzy made cookies, and most cookies were eaten by Jack.
Where the assumption is that in each instance of noun phrase ellipsis (NPE), a noun
is present in the syntactic representation, which is left unpronounced. Elbourne
adopts the assumption that one of the licensing conditions on NPE is that an NP
antecedent be overtly expressed in the discourse context (the bolded nouns in 38).10
In the next chapter, I will argue that the type of ellipsis assumed here, noun
phrase ellipsis (NPE), does not occur in English, contrary to what is traditionally
assumed. However, I will keep with Elbourne in assuming NPE here, for sake of
argument. Obviously, the arguments presented in the following chapters should also
be taken to weigh against such a proposal.
Elbourne contends that such elided NPs are responsible for the anaphoric
descriptive content borne by, for instance, the pronouns in (39), (40) and (41),
which Elbourne (2005) dubs neontological. The second member of each pair elicits
the underlying syntactic content assumed under the syntactic D-type theory:
(39) a. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man
who gave it to his mistress.
b. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man
who gave [[it i] paycheck] to his mistress.
(40) a. John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Everybody else put it in the
10See Lobeck (1995) for a number of suggestions pertaining to the syntactic licensing of NPE;
similar syntactic constraints pertaining to verb phrase ellipsis are discussed in Fiengo and May
(1994), Lasnik (1995), Merchant (2001).
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bank. (Cooper, 1979)
b. John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Everybody else put [[it i]
paycheck] in the bank.
(41) a. This year the president is a Republican. Next year he will be a
Democrat.
b. This year the president is a Republican. Next year [[he i] president]
will be a Democrat.
Thus, according to this theory, the anaphoric component (at least as far as the
description goes) of pronouns is identified with that of NPE. This assumption about
the presence of an elided NP is also what allows Elbourne to identify pronouns with
definite determiners both with respect to their syntax and semantics.
It is also this feature of Elbourne’s approach, along with the assumption that
NPE is a surface anaphor (Hankamer and Sag 1976), which is meant to account for
the problem of the formal link, by requiring the presence of a proper syntactically
expressed antecedent to the anaphoric NP.11
(42) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. ?? Every heterosexual monogamous married man is sitting next to her.
Assuming co-intensional restrictions for the quantifier every in the two sentences, the
issue is to explain the failure of anaphora in (42b). Evidently the truth-conditional
properties of the expression alone are not sufficient to describe the licensing pattern
11This is taken to be a necessary condition for NPE licensing in the relevant cases.
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of anaphora. Instead, Elbourne offers a syntactic explanation: anaphora is licensed
in (42a) due to the presence of the overt NP antecedent wife, which leads to the
satisfaction of the condition on NPE licensing, (43). No such NP antecedent is
present in (42b), which leads to a violation of the NPE condition.
(43) NPE Licensing Condition12
A formally identical linguistic antecedent to the elided NP must be available
in the surrounding discourse.
Below, I will demonstrate that the condition on NPE licensing in (43) is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the licensing of these anaphoric pronouns.
Sticking with the D-type accounts for the moment, we can verify that, in a
number of cases, substituting definite descriptions for the pronouns gives us roughly
the same reading, in accord with the semantic part of the analysis:13
(44) a. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man
who gave the paycheck to his mistress.
b. John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Everybody else put the pay-
check in the bank.
c. This year the president is a Republican. Next year the president
will be a Democrat.
The idea that pronouns can be treated as determiners followed by a nominal
constituent goes back to Postal (1966), and is discussed in the work of Panagiotidis
12This is a paraphrase of Elbourne 2005: 44.
13The first two cases involving possessive might be slightly degraded.
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(2002, 2003). Postal took the following examples to support such an idea:
(45) a. [we Americans]
b. [us linguists]
c. [you Communists]
d. (dialectally) [them guys], (Scots) [they Sassenachs]
(46) [You troops] will embark but the other troops will remain.
(47) [We Americans] distrust [you Europeans]
Elbourne follows Postal in assuming that, in these cases, the noun realized is the
head of the nominal constituent which would have otherwise been elided.
Again, following Postal, he takes it that those can’t be appositive construc-
tions, as they do not involve a ‘comma intonation’:
(48) You, troops, will embark.
Given what I have introduced so far, we can see how the analysis of some donkey
pronouns would go:
(49) Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
Here, the covariation could be obtained by having a variable part of the semantic of
the pronoun bound by the QP ‘every man who owns a donkey’, and the descriptive
content ‘donkey’ supplied by NPE.14
14This is basically what Heim & Kratzer (1998) offer (excluding the assumption about NPE):
iii. 1. [the [R〈7 ,〈e,et〉〉 pro〈1 ,e〉 ]]
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However, given this analysis, a problem arises for donkey pronouns in condi-
tional sentences:
(50) a. If a man owns a donkey, he always beats it.
b. ∀x∀y((man(x)∧ donkey(y)∧ owns(x, y))→ beats(x, y))
(51) a. If a man is from Athens, he always likes ouzo.
b. ∀x(man-from-Athens(x)→ likes-ouzo(x))
Here, we will not be able to obtain co-variation by having the pronouns in the
consequent bound by one of the QPs in the antecedent of the conditional, as no
c-command relation holds between any such pair.
This issue is, in some sense, related to another apparent problem first raised
by Heim (1982). Recall that D-type theories treat pronouns as definite descriptions.
Since the work of Frege (1879, 1893) and Russell (1905) it has been noted that (sin-
gular) definite descriptions appear to require of their referent that it be presupposed
or proffered to both exist and be unique in the relevant context.15
Considering our donkey sentences, it is obvious that we are at risk of deriving
the following:
(52) If a man is from Athens, the unique man from Athens always likes ouzo.
2. every man who owns a donkey [λ1 [t1 beats [the [R〈7 ,〈e,et〉〉 pro〈1 ,e〉 ]]]]
Clearly, this exact analysis could not be reprised by Elbourne given what we have seen so
far, since we only have one index for the whole DP. His take on covariation will be explicated
immediately below.
15On this issue I follow Elbourne (2005) in assuming a Fregean treatment of presuppositions. I
will come back to this later, upon discussing the problem of the formal link.
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However, the sentence in (51) does not have this reading.
Here, in order to circumvent this issue, Elbourne follows Heim (1990) in adopt-
ing a situation semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983; Kratzer 1989). The idea is to
assume quantification over minimal situations, where covariation emerges from (i)
the possibility of anaphorically picking out situations16 and (ii) the linking of the
situations in the two clauses through the meaning of operators such as quantifiers
(e.g. every), and adverbs of quantification (e.g. always). Where the situation found
in the consequent clause of a conditional is an extension of that found in the an-
tecedent clause:17
(53) conditional denotation (easy version)
For every minimal situation s such that there is a man from Athens in s,
there is an extension s′ such that the unique man from Athens in s likes
ouzo in s′.
We can also see how this appeal to situations resolves the worry about the presuppo-
sitions tied to definite descriptions. In uttering a donkey sentence, the presupposi-
tion is to be evaluated only relative to each minimal situation quantified over by the
antecedent, and not the broader context in which the whole sentence is understood.
One last aspect of Elbourne’s approach I wish to address, before moving onto
issues with the account, is the notion of ambiguity with respect to his treatment of
indices. Whereas Elbourne explicitly seeks to offer a univocal account of pronouns,
16Situations are part of the metalanguage under Elbourne’s conception, but have been argued
to be part of the object language elsewhere, e.g. Percus 2000.
17Where we use ≤ for ‘is extended by’, as in s1 ≤ s2 .
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his is still an ambiguity thesis. The real difference only pertains to where exactly
the ambiguity is located. Focusing only on pronouns, we have seen above that the
syntax and semantics offered for them involved an index-function, present in the
syntax, although covert:
(54) Syntactic D-type Pronouns
a. Syntax: [[ it i ] NP ]
b. Semantics: λf 〈e,t〉.λg : g ∈ D〈e,t〉 & ∃!x(f(x) = 1 & g(x) = 1). ιx.(f(x) =
1 & g(x) = 1)
As noted by Elbourne (2005: p.154), under this theory, anaphoric pronouns in
donkey sentences cannot involve an index function co-indexed with the antecedent.
Again, given that the pronoun and intended antecedent do not stand in a c-command
relation, sharing of the index would lead the pronoun to denote a unique individual
in all cases.
(55) ?? Every man who owns [a donkey]i beats [[ it i] donkey]
⇐⇒
∃x. Donkey(x) ∀y. Man(y) & Own(y, x)→ Beat(y, x)
In any instance where quantification involves situations with different donkeys, this
would yield a contradiction.18 Clearly this is undesirable.
18That is, if the pronoun is referential to a specific entity in the context, bearing index 1, which
descriptively corresponds to the entity introduced in the antecedent clause (it is a donkey), which
crucially bears an index different from 1, then we would make a statement about a unique donkey
in a situation which necessarily includes two.
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In order to handle such issues, he introduces a dummy index ‘0’, to figure in
these cases. The index is suggested to have the following, vacuous, denotation:
(56) J 0 K = λx : x ∈ De .x ∈ De
The denoting function imposes the requirement that its argument be a member
of the domain of entities, which will be satisfied vacuously by any possible entity
denoted by a pronoun.
Under Elbourne’s account then, the difference between deictic pronouns, bound
pronouns and donkey pronouns lies in the fact that the latter bear this vacuous in-
dex.
I find such a take on indices rather unexplanatory, especially for an approach
which contends to do away with the ambiguity treatment often assumed by theorists
seeking to give a proper account of the interpretation of pronouns. As we will see
below, a further stipulation, of a very similar flavor, ends up also being required
for the descriptive part of pronouns, in order to yield the correct readings in other
contexts. I will come back to this issue, but let me only point out that where I agree
with the spirit of Elbourne’s attempt to devise an account which generalizes over
all uses of pronouns, I am not convinced by this specific implementation.
2.2.2 Notes on the Syntax of Pronouns
Before moving on to semantic and pragmatic issues pertaining to D-type theories, I
wish to make a few remarks about the syntax of pronouns in relation to the syntax
of putative NPE. First, I will address some remarks by Elbourne (2005) on the
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topic of some pronouns which combine with relative clauses (RC). Following this, I
will briefly discuss the differential possibility of adjunct stranding for pronouns and
putative NPE.
2.2.2.1 Pronouns and Relative Clauses
As noted by Elbourne (2005) and subsequent related work, it appears that some
RCs may restrict some pronouns:
(57) Voldemort Pronouns
a. He [RC who should not be named] was not invited to the party.
b. She [RC who must be obeyed] has made her entrance.
As seen above, Elbourne (2005) proposes that pronouns have the syntax and se-
mantics of (definite) determiners followed by an elided NP. RCs as in (57) are taken
to be stranded after the elision of the noun, (58), and as such this analysis of the
phenomenon bolsters the claim that anaphoric pronouns involve elided NPs.
(58) [DP he i [NP sorcerer [RC who should not be named] ] ]
Elbourne (2005) further points out that such voldermort pronouns can also
appear in donkey configurations:
(59) [Every man who met a woman who had to be obeyed] said that [she who
had to be obeyed] told him to make himself scarce.
However, whereas the syntactic D-type analysis can provide a straightforward
analysis of such cases, I believe that this evidence should be taken mildly.
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First, as already pointed out by Elbourne (2005), the third singular neuter
pronoun of English, ‘it’, cannot combine with RCs:
(60) * It which should not be eaten was never served at the party.
He does not provide an analysis of this idiosyncrasy, and neither will I, but he
suggests that it might be related to the impossibility to use this word in certain
contexts where demonstratives are expected:
(61) a. Look at that!
b. Look at her!
c. Look at him!
d. * Look at it!
Be that as it may, I find other idiosyncrasies which cast doubt on the strength of
this evidence.
For one, notice that whereas wh-RCs can attach to pronouns, Comp-RCs can-
not. Compare the unacceptable string in (62) to its acceptable counterpart in (57a).
(62) * He [RC that should not be named] was not invited to the party.
Further, note that such RCs are possible to combine with both overt definite
descriptions and putative cases of NPE:
(63) a. The stud that my sister kissed was not invited to the party.
b. My mother invited a lot of boys, but many that my sister kissed
were not invited.
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Further, note that non-restrictive RCs cannot combine with pronouns, even
though they can both combine with definite descriptions and cases of ellipsis:
(64) a. * He which should not be named was not invited at Harry’s birth-
day party.
b. The boy which should not be named was not invited to Harry’s
birthday party.
c. Many which should not be named were not invited to Harry’s
birthday party.
It thus appears to me that the distributional evidence coming from the possible
combination with some relative clauses constitutes more of a puzzle than of evidence
in favor of the syntactic approach.
2.2.2.2 Adjunct Stranding
Typically, cases of Noun Phrase Ellipsis (NPE) in English can strand adjuncts, as
in (65a). However, pronouns cannot strand adjuncts in this way, as shown in (65b).
(65c) involves a full definite description, which, as we have seen, is assumed to be
equivalent in meaning and structure to the anaphoric pronoun.
(65) a. A girl from Swabia is meaner than one from Bavaria.
b. * The girl from Swabia is meaner than her from Bavaria.
c. The girl from Swabia is meaner than the girl from Bavaria.
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The underlying structures of both (65a) and (65b) are roughly the same according
to the Elbournian account, where in both cases the elision of the NP girl is licensed
by the overt local antecedent NP from the matrix clause.
(66) a. [DP one [NP girl] [PP from Bavaria] ]
b. * [DP [ she/her i ] [NP girl] [PP from Bavaria] ]
All else being equal, we would expect PP adjunction to the elided NP to be accept-
able in both cases, and the subsequent stranding to obtain in both cases as well.
However, if we assume that pronouns do not actually involve any elided NP at all,
but are of category D as I assume, nothing special needs to be said here.
Turning to French, the same point can be made, where NPE allows for the





















































‘There were big boys and little ones too.’
But here again, pronouns cannot appear followed by prenominal modifiers:
19These data originate from the work of Herschensohn (1978) who argues that those sentences
































































‘I’ve seen the boys in the courtyard. The big one was playing with the
little one.’
I take these differences to point to the conclusion that elided NPs are not
present in the pronouns’ inner syntax.
2.2.3 Reaching Out
The discourse contexts in which anaphoric pronouns and NPE find an accessible
antecedent greatly overlap. Consider, for instance, the environment in which we
find paycheck-pronouns and cases of cross-sentential anaphora with subordination
(what Geurts 2011 calls piggyback anaphora):
(71) a. The man who gave some wine to his wife was wiser than the man who
gave some wine to his mistress.
b. The man who gave some wine to his wife was wiser than the man who
gave it to his mistress.
c. Most birds left early this year. I hope some birds will come back next
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summer.
d. Most birds left early this year. I hope they will come back next
summer.
Under a syntactic d-type account, we expect the distribution of anaphoric
pronouns to be subsumed by that of NPE, excluding cases where the unacceptable
use of the pronoun or of Det+NPE can be blamed on some characteristics of the
determiner heading the nominal constituent, or other elements figuring (or assumed
to figure) in the nominal constituent.20 This prediction is a necessary consequence
of the identification of the anaphoric content with the content of the elided NP
constituent.
However, one needs to be careful in assessing the source of unacceptability.
For instance, consider NPE in the environment typical of donkey pronouns:
(72) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats some donkeys ?*(at his neigh-
bor’s farm)
Here, without the added PP modifier at his neighbor’s farm the quantifier some+
NPE seems slightly degraded. However, this degradation is easily attributable to
pragmatic factors, and is not due to the ellipsis. For one, the fully spelled out DP
some donkeys would contribute the same type of weirdness. Rather, some is an
indefinite, and as such tends to be understood as introducing a new entity to the
20With the pronoun itself incorporating aspects of the semantics of definite descriptions, following
the D-type tradition, and thus subject to similar, if not the same pragmatic restrictions.
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discourse; it is marked as the head of an anaphoric constituent which maximally
resumes an antecedent. The added prepositional phrase modifies the discourse con-
text, and somewhat eases the required accommodation.
In what follows, I turn to a number of cases where no such explanation can
be coined without adding to our already existing syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic
machinery. I will claim that in those cases, the lack of parallelism in the distribution
of the anaphors is simply due to the fact that pronouns do not involve NPE. Instead,
I will claim that the pronoun takes a salient discourse referent(s) as antecedent(s).
Furthermore, in the next chapter, I will argue that cases of ellipsis do not in fact
involve the deletion of a noun phrase, but rather the deletion of a partitive phrase
involving a plural anaphoric pronoun. This is what will account for the similarity
in distribution between pronouns and cases of ellipsis.
2.2.4 Absenteeist Antecedents
This section argues that an overt NP antecedent is not necessary for the licensing
of anaphoric pronouns. In order to reach this conclusion, the cases examined are
those of event anaphora and deep anaphora which lack such an antecedent.
2.2.4.1 Event Anaphora
Since Davidson (1967), it has become common to treat sentences as expressing
existential quantification over events. In the discussion to follow, I will use Neo-
Davidsonian logical forms, like (73b) for (73a), which treat thematic relations as
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separate conjuncts.21
(73) a. Jean hugged Marie
b. ∃e.Hugged(e) & Agent(e, Jean) & Patient(e,Marie)
Much work has also investigated anaphoric reference to events.22 It is typically
taken that pronouns can find their reference in events introduced by previous sen-
tences, as in (74). There, the intended referent of the pronoun is the event of ‘Gob
making his father disappear on a boat’; that is, the event verifying the existential
statement of the first sentence.
(74) Gob made his father disappear on a boat. It wasn’t very impressive though.
Event-pronouns can also behave as donkey-pronouns, (75a), and partial de-
scriptions, (75b). In (75a), the targeted antecedent predicate can be obtained
through conjunction reduction of the conditional’s protasis, as in (76a). In (75b), the
required predicate can be obtained through conjunction reduction of the previous
sentence’s description, as in (76b).
(75) a. Whenever Lucille hears that Michael will visit the other Bluths, She
knows it will be a disaster.
b. John was killed in broad daylight in NYC. It would have never hap-
pened to Marie in Paris.
21Among others, Higginbotham (1983, 1985, 1986); Parsons 1990; Schein 1993; Landman 2000;
see also the articles in Higginbotham, Pianesi and Varzi 2000.
22Among others, Asher 1993; Peterson 1982; Kehler and Ward 2004.
44
(76) a. λe. Agent(e, Michael) & Visit(e) & Theme(e, the other Bluths)
b. λe. Kill(e) & In-Broad-Daylight(e)
Such cases are problematic for the syntactic D-type approach, given that no overt
NPs standing for descriptions such as those in (76) are available in the preceding
discourse. This should lead to a violation of the NPE licensing condition. But it
does not, instead, the anaphora is licensed.23
Furthermore, cases of event anaphora do not appear to be constrained to
syntactic constituents as their antecedents, but rather to something like conjunctions
of Neo-Davidsonian arguments. For instance, it is possible to find examples where
23A possible resolution to this problem, suggested to me by Kyle Rawlins (p.c.), could be that the
VP constituents serve as formal antecedents in such cases, thus licensing ellipsis. Such an approach
would be in line with analyses of gerunds which hold that a VP is present in the NP constituent
(Abney 1987, Pullum 1991), and the fact that such nominalized expressions can undergo NPE:
iv. [John’s [VP discovering a new planet] ] surprised me, but [Mary’s[VPdiscorvering a new
planet]] didn’t.
The underlying LF of the pronoun in an example like (75a) above would be like the following (I
abstract away from considerations of tense here):
v. [it [VPMichael visit the other Bluths]]
However, such a view on ellipsis would require that a VP can antecede typical cases of NPE, which
is not the case:
vi. *Alfonso was singing to Isabella, and this didn’t surprise me, but [Bill’s [VP singing to
Isabella]] did, since I didn’t know he sang, or even liked Isabella.
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the sought antecedent is a non-constituent, as in (77).
(77) a. A mobster shot Bill. It would have never happened to Clint because
he instills such fear in mobsters.
b. λe. Agent(e, A mobster) & Shot(e)
Here, the antecedent involves the content supplied by the subject a mobster as well
as the content supplied by the verb shot, to the exclusion of the content supplied by
the object Bill. But this content is not provided by any phrasal constituent of the
anteceding sentence.
It is also important to stress that modifying the NPE condition will not do
either. NPE is more constrained than pronouns, in that it cannot have an event
antecedent supplied by a sentence. This is illustrated by the following pair of exam-
ples:
(78) a. My sister got mugged in Springfield last week, and it happened to my
brother this week.
b. My sister got mugged in Springfield last week #(, and [some/few/
several/one [NP mugging]] happened to my brother this week).
c. My sister’s mugging was horrible, but my [brother’s [NP mugging]]
was even worse.
In (78a), the pronoun it is anaphoric to the event description getting mugged in
Springfield, and the discourse segment is fully coherent and acceptable. However,
considering the different determiners which allow for NPE in (78b), it is obvious
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that NPE targeting an event description in the same context is infelicitous. That is,
without an overt antecedent, as in (78c), NPE is not licensed, whereas the pronom-
inal anaphora is. It thus appears that the NPE condition, as stated above, might
be adequate for cases of ellipsis, but not for anaphoric pronouns.24
Cases of deep event anaphora are also possible with pronouns, as in (79).25 Yet
here again, NPE cannot access the desired event descriptions in the same context,
(80).
(79) a. [While looking at an arguing couple]:
It always happens right after Valentine’s Day.
b. [A student is freaking out]:
It always happens during the dissertation process.
(80) a. [While looking at an arguing couple]:
??Some/Most/All argument(s) always happen(s) right after Valen-
tine’s Day.
b. [A student is freaking out]:
??Some/Most/All freak-out(s) always happen(s) during the disserta-
tion process.
I conclude from such cases that satisfaction of the NPE licensing Condition
is not necessary for the licensing of anaphoric pronouns. Rather, the semantic D-
type approach seems superior here. The contextual function can readily range over
24I offer an alternative explanation to the ellipsis case in the next chapter.
25I thank Alexis Wellwood and Alexander Williams for pointing out these examples.
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event-predicates introduced by previous discourse or other contextual factors. The
syntactic D-type approach is too restricted to account for such cases.
2.2.4.2 Deep Anaphora
Whereas Elbourne (2005) does not discuss cases of event anaphora, he does address
other types of deep anaphora, such as the following case:
(81) [We are walking through Boston, and come across someone with the
following characteristics: early twenties, male, skateboarding,
wearing a Red Sox cap, smiling broadly. Paul gestures towards him
and says]:
a. [He [NP ?????]] looks happy!
b. # [Most [NP ?????]] look more depressed than that.
Here, the issue is clear. If he is a definite description with an elided NP in (81a),
what is the NP that could be elided, and how is it licensed? This question is even
more pressing, given the unacceptability of the parallel NPE example in (81b).
To tackle such examples, Elbourne proposes the following LF:
(82) a. He looks happy!
b. [ [he 2] ONE ]
In (82), the pronoun he is taken to be a function of type 〈 〈e, t〉, 〈 〈e, t〉, 〈e〉 〉 〉. The
first argument of type 〈e, t〉 is an index-function (‘2’ in this case), and the second
is an NP supplying the description. The NP ONE occurring in (82) is a dummy
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phonologically null noun, which Elbourne stipulates is always available and does not
require a linguistic antecedent to be licensed. It is contextually restricted and has
the vacuous semantic contribution in (83).26
(83) JONEK = λx : x ∈ De .x ∈ De
In such instances of deixis, the NP predicate is neutralized, and the index of the
pronoun is taken to be responsible for reference resolution, as in the traditional
account.
However, there are cases of deep anaphora where the pronoun must pick out
a predicate, in order to ensure covariation:
(84) [A new faculty member picks up her first paycheck from her mailbox.
Waving it in the air, she says to a colleague]:
Do most faculty members deposit it in the Credit Union? (Jacobson 2000)
Here, a fixed referent will not work. The checks denoted by the pronoun covary
with the individuals of the restrictor of the QP most faculty members. Rather, the
predicate ‘check’ appears to be what is retrieved.
To resolve this conundrum, Elbourne suggests that a description provided by
the non-linguistic context does not require an overt antecedent (Elbourne 2005: 44).
This has the effect of making the licensing of anaphoric D-type pronouns a hybrid
26Note that under this theory, the same vacuous meaning is postulated for the dummy index
0, which is required every time a contentful NP predicate is present, as in the case of donkey
pronouns. That is, uses of a meaningful index and uses of a meaningful NP are in complementary
distribution, which makes it suspicious that their syntactic and semantic extent should be distinct.
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mechanism, partly syntactic and partly pragmatic. In other words, this version of
the syntactic D-type approach holds that the condition on NPE is only necessary in
a subset of cases, and does not apply in instances where the antecedent is supplied
by the broader context.
Hence, the syntactic approach avails itself both of the rather free anaphoric
range of the contextually supplied predicate assumed under the semantic D-type
approach, and of the restricted distribution imposed by the NPE licensing condi-
tion (where it applies). Such an approach must assume some form of pragmatic
restrictions to apply and guide interpretation for cases such as (84); presumably re-
strictions of a very similar nature, if not the same, are required under the semantic
approach. At this point, the only reason for the D-type theorist to hold on to the
NPE licensing condition is in order to account for the formal link generalization.
However, as I will argue in §2.2.5, the pragmatic conditions required even under the
syntactic D-type account may be sufficient to account for this generalization.
Given such considerations, the semantic D-type approach, supplied with ap-
propriate pragmatic principles, would be simpler and preferable.
2.2.5 The Problem of the Formal Link
The condition on NPE licensing alone is not sufficient to account for the distribution
of anaphoric pronouns. In fact, numerous cases can be found where pronominal
anaphora fails despite the overt presence of a suitable nominal antecedent in the
discourse context. In order to account for such cases, other conditions are required.
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Consider first the following cases:
(85) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats it donkey.
b. # Speaking of the successor-function, every number is smaller than it
successor. (Heim 1990: 167)
c. # Every guitar player brought it guitar to the party.
d. # Every physics student thinks it physics is superior to chemistry.
e. # I first introduced my wife and then realized that every married man
was sitting next to her wife.27
If all that mattered was the NPE licensing condition, anaphora should be licensed
in cases where a nominal premodifier is present as in (85b,c,d). Yet such exam-
ples strongly contrast in acceptability with, for instance, cases of donkey anaphora
as in (85a). Other cases, such as (85e), can also be found where a formally suit-
able antecedent NP is present, however not embedded within the restrictor of the
quantifier responsible for covariation. Under the syntactic account, given that no
principle requires the linking of the restriction of the quantifier with the putative
NP antecedent, the unacceptability of such examples is still not accounted for.28
27Here, the reading sought is one where the anaphoric pronoun her covaries with the married
men, each man sitting next to his own wife.
28Note that under dynamic approaches, such examples, just like typical formal link cases, are un-
problematic. This is because under such theories, pronouns, just as anaphoric definite descriptions,
are typically taken to resume a discourse referent (Karttunen 1969) introduced to the context by
another expression. In none of these cases was there an appropriate discourse referent introduced,
given that they are typically taken to be introduced by means of an indefinite NP, and not by
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Observe also that NPs embedded under privative modifiers cannot serve as
antecedents for pronouns, (86a,b). This is surprising given the felicity of the equiv-
alent overt definite descriptions in the same context. It is further puzzling, given
that NPs embedded under privative modifiers may antecede NPE, as exemplified in
(86c).
(86) a. If a child has a fake diamond and visits a jeweler, he thinks that
{#[ they diamonds]/[the diamonds]} are prettier than [ his fake
diamond].
b. Every citizen who meets a former president wants #[him presi-
dent]/[the president] to lower taxes.
c. Every woman who has fake diamonds wishes she had [some[NP dia-
monds]] that were real.
Under the syntactic account, the examples in (86a,b) could perhaps be accounted
for by modifying the condition on NPE licensing. For instance, it could be required
that the antecedent be a maximal phrase, thus including all modifiers. However,
such a remedy does not appear adequate given that NPE does not generally target
maximal phrases exclusively:
(87) John ate green smarties all afternoon. Mary only ate [some[NP smarties/
* green smarties]] in the evening, and they were all red.
Here the elided constituent must only be the NP smarties and not the maximal
phrase green smarties.
modifiers or expressions of the like. I come back to such approaches below.
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Hence, semantic or pragmatic conditions appear to be required to account for
the cases seen so far. I turn to such considerations upon discussing semantic D-type
approaches.
2.2.6 Split Antecedents
Further problems arise for the syntactic account when considering cases where pro-
nouns have split antecedents, as in (88).29 Here again, there are no proper overt
single NP antecedent to satisfy the NPE condition. Rather, the antecedents occur
as independent NPs which are not necessarily conjoined, as seen in (88e).
(88) a. If Mary hasn’t seen John lately, or Ann misses Bill, she calls him.
(Stone, 1992)
b. If Mary sees a donkey or a horse, she waves to it.
c. If Mary sees John or Bill, she waves to him.
d. If Mary sees a donkey and a horse, she waves to them.
e. If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he always loves them both
equally.30
Elbourne recognizes such cases as problematic, but discusses the two-step
mechanism proposed by Fiengo and May (1994: 200) for the parallel phenomenon
of VP ellipsis:
29See for instance Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991; Stone 1992; Chierchia 1995; Schlenker 2010,
2011, amongst others.
30This example is due to Alexander Williams, cited by Elbourne (2005:118).
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(89) a. Step 1: Select the required lexical items in the syntactic environment.
b. Step 2: Build the desired antecedent NP out of these items.
As just pointed out, (88e) lacks a conjunction in the discourse context, and so one
wonders where this piece comes from.
VP ellipsis is subject to the same complications:31
(90) a. Max is always using the fax. Oscar is always using the Xerox. I can’t,
of course, when they are.
b. Mary swam the English Channel. Mary climbed Kilimanjaro. I did,
too.
Again, Elbourne states that this is a problem for the syntactic D-type approach just
as much as it is a problem for current analyses of ellipsis in general.
Here, I wish to raise a further issue which arises for the syntactic approach,
pertaining to the grammar of determiner sharing. The result of the mechanism
suggested would allow for the structure in (91b), involving the conjunction of two
NPs. The construction is equivalent to the underlying form of the full definite
description in (92b). This seems correct given that the meaning of (91a) appears
equivalent to the meaning of (92a).
(91) a. If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he always loves them.
b. [DP [them i ] [NP [wife] and [donkey]] ]
31These examples are taken from Fiengo and May (1994).
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(92) a. If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he always loves the wife and
donkey.
b. [DP [the i ] [NP [NP wife] and [NP donkey]] ]
However, the mechanism assumed under the modified D-type approach is prob-
lematic for languages such as French (93b,b′), Italian, and Modern Greek, which
forbid so-called determiner-sharing :32
(93) a. The secretary of John and collaborator of Paul is/are at the station.














































































‘The secretaries of John and the collaborators of Paul are at the sta-
tion.’
32The data is taken from the work of Alexiadou, Haegeman, and Stavrou (2007: 66-68).
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We see in (93a) that in a language like English, two NPs conjoined under a single
determiner can denote a plurality of referents and trigger plural agreement on the
verb; alternatively the same phrase can be taken to denote a single individual to
which both properties expressed apply (here that of being John’s secretary and
Paul’s collaborator). As seen in (93b), the conjunction of two DPs necessarily
denotes a plurality of referents and cannot trigger singular agreement on the verb.
Turning to the French case in (94b), we see that there, just as in English, the
conjunction of two DPs yields an unambiguously plural referent. However, the con-
junction of NPs under a single determiner, (94a), cannot yield a plurality of distinct
individuals as in English. Rather, the resulting phrase denotes a single individual
satisfying both properties denoted by the conjoined NPs. Crucial here as well is the
interpretation of a sentence such as (94c), where conjoining two plural NPs under
a plural determiner leads to a plurality of individuals, each of which must satisfy
both properties denoted by the NPs. The plurality cannot be heterogeneous, and
so the issue in (94a) is not just one of φ-feature marking on the determiner.
Here I cannot give a full analysis of determiner sharing. But I do assume that
(95) holds in languages like French, Italian and Greek.
(95) No Determiner Sharing: Each referent in a nominal conjunction requires its
own determiner.
This bans the possibility of satisfying the NPE condition for cases of split an-
tecedents. Consider for instance the anaphoric pronoun in the sentence in (96).
Given the mechanism introduced above, we would have the LF in (97) for the
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‘If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he tends to love them.’
(97) [DP [les i ] [NP femmes et ânes]]
However, given the lack of determiner-sharing in this language, such an LF
cannot yield the correct reading; rather, such a construction would require that every
entity referred to must be both a woman and a donkey (e.g. J(97)K 6= J(91b)K).
Clearly this is not the desired result.
The semantic approach can readily account for such cases, assuming that
salient predicates can be combined to form new predicates for the purpose of anaphora.
2.2.7 Semantic D-Type
As we have seen above, the mere presence in the syntax of a potential antecedent
for the contentful part of a pronoun is not sufficient to license anaphora. Other
considerations are relevant. This observation raises the question of whether the
syntactic form of the antecedent ever plays a crucial role in the licensing of the
dependency.
Another view would be that what matters to anaphora is not the formal pres-
ence of the phrase, but rather the semantic and pragmatic effects of tokening it.
What matters are its contributions to the discourse context. This is the possibility
I wish to explore here. I do not contend to offer a complete picture of all of the
57
pragmatic considerations going into licensing anaphoric pronouns. Rather, I will
review the difficult cases just discussed, and make suggestions as to how they could
be accounted for under a pragmatic treatment. The conditions I will call upon here
are not new to the current work. They are a subset of the conditions argued for by
Nouwen (2003: 76-77), following much preceding work; namely, (i) inferrability, (ii)
uniqueness, (iii) use of semantically available information only and (iv) support of
discourse coherence by the anaphoric link.33
I mean only to suggest that what appears to be pragmatically required in such
cases is sufficient to account for the problem of the formal link. This last problem
thus being dealt with, the semantic d-type approach can be considered again.
Focus first on the cases with antecedents occurring as NP modifiers of another
NP (85b,c,d), and antecedents occurring outside the restrictor of a quantificational
expression, such as (85e) repeated here:
(98) * I first introduced my wife and then realized that every married man was
sitting next to her wife.
For such cases I would like to suggest that a slight modification of Craige Roberts
weak familiarity presupposition accurately rules out such unacceptable cases of
anaphoric linking:
(99) Roberts’ weak familiarity redux:
A presupposition of weak familiarity requires that the existence of the
intended entity, [and presence or relevance in the context/situation un-
33See also Asher and Lascarides (2003), as well as Kehler (2005) on the notion of coherence.
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der discussion-MG]34, be entailed by the local context of utterance, as
reflected on the Scoreboard in [the Discourse Representation]. (Roberts
2010: 15)
In (98), nothing entails the presence or relevance of every married man’s wife in
the situation or context characterized by the sentence. This leads to a failure of
the presupposition. The presupposition also correctly rules out the cases involving
NP modifiers, such as (85b,c,d), where no potential referent satisfying the relevant
predicates have been introduced to the discourse context.
Considering cases involving privative modifiers, as in (86b), repeated in (100).
Here, a condition on salience, like that in that what rules out such cases is the
condition on salience in (101).
(100) Every citizen who meets a former president wants *[ him president ]/[the
president] to lower taxes.
(101) Predicate-Salience
The predicate satisfying the contextual variable must be salient.
I will not attempt to define salience. But the idea that anaphoric constructions
respond to salience is familiar from Prince 198635, as well as Grosz and Sidner 1986,
and others. I assume that a predicate P can be made salient in various ways. One
34Note that this addition is an integral part of dynamic accounts, where discourse referents are
resumed by the anaphor. This is the type of treatment I will ultimately adopt below.
35Prince argues that various constructions are felicitous only given the salience of a certain “open
proposition”. An “open propositions” is in effect a predicate.
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way is the use of an expression E that denotes P. But I offer one restriction on when
E will make P salient, (102).
(102) conditions on Predicate-Salience
A predicate P occurring in a quantificational construction Φ is made
salient if Φ ranges over Ps.
According to the licensing condition, In order for the predicate ‘president’ to be
made salient in (100), the expression a former president would have to range over
individuals who satisfy the description ‘president’: However, it does not, and, as a
result, pronominal anaphora to the predicate ‘president’ fails.
Two distinct types of conditions appear to be required in order to account both
for the similarities and the differences between anaphoric pronouns and anaphoric
uses of definite descriptions. As we have already seen above in (86), overt defi-
nite descriptions and anaphoric pronouns behave differently in the environment of
NPs modified by privatives. Furthermore, covarying definite descriptions are not
necessarily licensed in formal link configurations:
(103) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her/ the wife/the bride.
b. Every heterosexual married man is sitting next to #her/#the wife/
#the bride.
In (103b), the example involving a full definite description is unacceptable despite
the fact that the DP in question supplies a description overtly (viz. ‘wife/bride’).
This unacceptability cannot, then, be blamed on a condition on predicate salience,
and even less on a condition on NPE. Rather, a condition like Weak Familiarity
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seems appropriate here. The existence of a married man, whereas it entails the
existence of a partner, does not entail the presence of a partner in the relevant
context or situation. More contextual support is needed to draw such an inference,
and so anaphora is not licensed.
However, cases which minimally differ from the typical formal link sentences
can easily be constructed, where covariation with a full definite description is pos-
sible:36
(104) Every heterosexual man who gets married kisses the wife/the bride.
Here, the modifier ‘married’ is enough to license the subsequent anaphoric reference
to the wife. It is not necessary to refer to the wife explicitly. Covariation with the
definite description ‘the wife’ is licensed (and this without the introduction of an
overt NP). If the man is getting married, then it must be the case that the partner
is present in the situation, and so weak familiarity is satisfied.
However, in the same context, pronominal anaphora fails, (105). I take this
to show that, while the construction implies wives, it does not makes salient the
predicate ‘wife’, which leads to a violation of Predicate-salience.
(105) # Every heterosexual man who gets married kisses her.
It is now unsurprising that the unacceptable cases of the formal link paradigm
should be ruled out. These cases, such as (106), violate both of the conditions
36I assume that these involve inference on the part of the addressee and fall in the bridging family
(Haviland and Clark 1974).
61
considered. The predicate sought has not been made salient37, leading to a violation
of predicate salience, and the relevant individuals are not weakly familiar in the
context, leading to a violation of weak familiarity.
(106) # Every heterosexual monogamous married man is sitting next to her.
The semantic D-type approach, supplemented with relevant and otherwise re-
quired pragmatic conditions, can account for the problem of the formal link. This
gives an edge to this latter approach against the syntactic D-type approach. The se-
mantic approach can readily account for cases of event anaphora and deep anaphora,
and for the formal link generalizations; whereas it is not clear how the syntactic ac-
count can tackle event anaphora, and is led to a hybrid approach, harnessing the
power of the semantic approach, for cases of deep anaphora. The syntactic approach
can straightforwardly account for the problem of the formal link, but this at the cost
of too restricted a theory.
2.3 Pronouns in Dynamic Approaches
There are two main families of theories which fit the label of dynamic approaches:
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981; Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle
1993 amonst others) and Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhoff
1990, 1991; Krifka 1995; van den Berg 1996, among others). Both families of theo-
ries generally treat the semantic representation of pronouns alike, but differ in the
37Here I am assuming that the expression married cannot satisfy the contextual predicate given
the φ-feature mismatch; e.g. married males have been made salient, but not married females.
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semantic architecture, and the specific way in which the value for anaphoric pro-
nouns is retrieved. Where there are dynamic elements to DRT, the interpretation
process itself is rather static. On the other hand, DPL-type theories offer a truly
dynamic interpretation process. Here, given that the representation of anaphoric
pronouns is what I am interested in, I will limit myself to a description of DRT,
which is simpler and more intuitive than DPL. I refer the reader to Nouwen (2003)
for a thorough discussion and comparison of these various theories.
In DRT, expressions supplied by the syntax, or LF, are translated in Discourse
Representation Structures (DRSs) through the recursive application of construction
rules. DRSs involve two components; (i) a set of variables or discourse referents
called the universe, and (ii) a set of conditions which apply to these discourse refer-
ents. These DRSs are interpreted in a static fashion. Assuming a modelM = 〈De , I〉
and a set of variables VAR, a DRS is a pair 〈V,C〉, where V ⊆ V AR and C is a set





b. ∃f : {x} → De such that f(x) ∈ I(P )
The DRS in (107) is true if and only if there exists a function such that the value of
the variable satisfies the condition in the model, (107b). In this system, indefinite
NPs are variables, discourse referents, introduced with a condition, which allows
them to take the quantificational force of the environment in which they occur.
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Such NPs basically introduce new discourse referents. On the other hand, pronouns
do not introduce new discourse referents, but resume old ones, introduced prior
in the discourse. The construction rule for pronouns states that they should be
replaced by accessible discourse referents.








b. All functions f that verify 〈Υ,Γ〉 in M can be extended to a function
which verifies 〈Υ′,Γ′〉 in M .
Basically, the consequent part of the DRS is dependent on the antecedent part of the
DRS for its interpretation. This is what accounts for the interpretation of pronouns
in donkey sentences. Consider the DRS, (109b), of the conditional donkey sentence
in (109a).









c. All functions f : {x, y} → De such that f(x) is a man and f(y) is a
donkey owned by f(x) in model M extend to a function f ′ : {x, y} →
De such that f
′(x) beats f ′(y).
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This dependence between the two sub-DRSs of the conditional sentence is what
makes the farmer and donkey antecedents accessible to the pronouns. This is what
is sometimes referred to as semantic binding, as opposed to syntactic binding.
In other cases, such as (110a), pronouns fail to resume a discourse referent,
since they lie outside the scope of operators which allow to extend the binding
relation.











This notion of accessibility is also what is taken to account for the problem of
the formal link discussed above.
(111) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. # Every heterosexual monogamous married man is sitting next to her.
In (111a), the indefinite a wife introduces a discourse referent which is accessible to
the pronoun. However, in (111b) no such discourse referent has been introduced.
The cases involving privative modifiers, and nominal modifiers, discussed above can
also be accounted for in the same way.
This concludes our brief discussion of the variable representation of pronouns
in dynamic approaches. In the next section, I will introduce further cases which
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weigh in favor of this type of representation for pronouns, as opposed to D-type
representations.
2.4 Against D-type Approaches
In this section, I wish to introduce serious challenges for D-type theories generally;
these challenges favor a reference-anaphoric treatment of pronouns as variables over
discourse referents, as under the dynamic theories. First, I will present a challenge
to the modified semantic D-type approach presented above. Then, I will present
a challenge which pertains to the anaphoric reach of plural pronouns in contexts
involving several possible antecedents. Finally, I present an unexpected contrast
between cases of pronouns of laziness, and minimal variations on these examples
involving copular sentences. I will then suggest that rather than complicating the
D-type approach, we should stick to the standard account, and amend it with the
possibility of deferred reference in order to account for cases of neontological pro-
nouns.
2.4.1 Salient Open Propositions
I suggested above that a semantic D-type account supplemented with a condition
on predicate salience could help us account for some cases of overgeneration, such as
those involving privative modifiers. Preliminary support for the plausibility of this
approach was drawn from the fact that predicate salience has already been suggested
in the literature to play a role in the licensing of a number of constructions, such
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as wh-clefts and it-clefts (Prince 1978, 1986). However, it turns out that salient
predicates (or predicates salient enough to license the mentioned constructions) are
not sufficient to license the use of pronouns.
First, consider the following cases:38
(112) The walls are such an ugly color. I was thinking of painting them beige.
a. The pipes are rusty.
b. # What’s rusty is the pipes.
c. # It’s the pipes that are rusty.
Here, only the sentence in (112a) is licit in such a discourse context; the cleft con-
structions in (112b,c) are not felicitous. Rather, such cleft constructions are only
licensed in a context where the relevant predicate (‘λx. x is rusty’ here) is salient.
Accordingly, the following examples could precede these cleft constructions, and
render them felicitous.
(113) Didn’t somebody say something was rusty, and needed sprucing up?
(114) I swear, the sink has to be the rustiest thing in the house.
Going back to pronouns, it is obvious that in the same context, in the context
where the predicate ‘λx. x is rusty’ is salient, such predicate cannot be taken as the
value of a pronoun.
(115) Didn’t somebody say something was rusty, and needed sprucing up?
a. # Yeah, Mary doesn’t like it.
38These examples are inspired from Vallduv́ı and Engdahl (1996).
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b. # Come next summer, it will be the sink.
Despite the fact that the relevant predicate is made salient by the first sentence,
neither pronouns in (115a) nor (115b) can be understood as standing for ‘the rusty
thing’.
This is very surprising under a semantic D-type account; why could a salient
predicate not be the value of the pronoun? Perhaps the answer would lie in different
levels of salience, but as we will see in what follows, it is more likely that D-type
accounts, despite their appeal, should be abandoned altogether.
2.4.2 What Can ‘They’ Reach for?
Upon considering contexts which involve a plurality of possible antecedents, an
unconstrained D-type theory overgenerates. To see this, consider the following ex-
ample:
(116) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [They] sat down.
Can refer to ‘Z’, or ‘X ∪ Y ∪ Z’
Cannot refer to ‘X ∪ Z’
c. [The boys] sat down.
Can refer to ‘The X ∪ Z’
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Considering the context provided in (116a), we see that a plural pronoun, as in
(116b), can resume the most salient plural antecedent, namely the ten young boys
who just walked in, and the set containing all of the referents introduced in the
context. Crucially, the plural pronoun cannot refer back only to the union of the
set of boyscouts (X) and the set of boys who just entered (Z). This exact reading
is what would be predicted if a D-type pronoun were possible here. That is, if the
pronoun could reach for the most recent, presumably most salient, noun phrase or
predicate introduced, boys or young boys here, we would expect the pronoun to have
a reading just like that of the definite description the boys, as in (116c). But this
reading is impossible for the pronoun.
Of course, it is still possible for a plural pronoun to have split antecedents, as
in (117).
(117) a. John(X) invited Mary(Y) to the party.
Bill(Z) came uninvited.
b. Things were going to get heated, as they both had been in love with
her for a long time.
‘they’ can refer to ‘X ∪ Z’
However, such antecedents are accessed by semantically combining discourse refer-
ents, through the union of the singleton sets or combination of the indices, and not
by accessing the descriptive content of these referents.
This last point can be made obvious by considering a context like that in (118).
(118) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
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There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, a young boy(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [They] sat down.
Can refer to ‘X ∪ Y ∪ Z’
Cannot refer to ‘X ∪ Z’
Given the context, and the minimal information provided by the sentence in (118b),
the plural pronoun can only refer back to the entirety of the discourse referents
introduced. Here again, under theories which take pronouns to be sensitive to an-
tecedent noun phrases, or predicates, we would expect the possibility to refer to all
the boys in the context. From (118) we can also deduce that Φ-features, such as plu-
ral marking, restrict not the anaphoric mechanism, but the referent of the pronoun,
in the way a predicate would. That is, if the plural marking on the pronoun was
contributing information such as ‘reach for the most recent/salient plural referent’,
then we would expect the girlscouts to be easily resumed by the pronoun. However
this is not the case; it seems that only the most recently introduced discourse ref-
erent has the relevant level of salience. In this case, given that it is singular, and
that the pronoun is plural, it is not possible to resume it, and the anaphor must be
resolved otherwise.
Still, given (117), one would expect that it would be possible to combine the
indices of the most recently introduced discourse referent with that of another set
of referents priorly introduced to the context, such as the boyscouts (X) in (118).
Changing slightly the sentence in which the pronoun occurs, so as to highlight this
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intended reading seems to make this possible, although the result is not perfect.
Consider the variation in (119).
(119) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, a young boy(Z) walked in whistling.
b. ? [They] (all) started to whistle at the girls.
Cannot refer to ‘X ∪ Y ∪ Z’
But with some accommodation, ‘X ∪ Z’
Here, the plural pronoun can refer back to the union of the set of boyscouts and
the singleton containing the young boy who just walked in. It also seems that the
anaphor is somehow more easily resolved when all is used, most likely due to its
strengthening effect (Brisson 1998).
2.4.3 Pronouns of Laziness and Copular Antecedent Clauses
As we have just seen, the pattern of resolution for plural anaphors in contexts
involving several antecedents favors the traditional view, the reference-anaphoric
approach, over the D-type representation. Neontological pronouns, on the other
hand, appear to favor the D-type approach. Consider here the cases of pronouns of
laziness, (120a), and paycheck pronouns, (120b), introduced above.
(120) a. This year, the president is a Democrat. Come next election, he will
be a Republican.
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b. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one
who gave it to his mistress.
However, a slight variation on the example involving a pronoun of laziness,
where the antecedent sentence is a copular sentence, suggests a different account.
Compare (121) to (120a).
(121) He is the president of the U.S. # Come next election, he will be a Republican.
In (121), the pronoun in the second sentence is only able to resume the individual,
who happens to be the president, which was introduced in the first sentence. It
cannot resume the ‘president’ description alone. This is unexpected under a D-
type theory. Surely the predicate is made salient in a copular sentence, given that
it basically consists of the core informational content of such sentences. Further,
the context of the second sentence is the same in (121) as in (120), and so an
account which settles the reference of D-type pronouns on the basis of the situations
considered would make the same prediction here.
Turning to specificational sentences, we find the same issue. Consider the
case in (122), where the formal presence of the definite description the manager in
subject position does not lead to an acceptable neontological reading in the follow
up sentence. And this despite a context which clearly biases towards the description
reading; surely the speaker is not contradicting himself. Alas, the description reading
does not appear to be possible.
(122) This afternoon the manager is John, who is always super nice.
But last night I got into a fight with #him [=the manager], since he was
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being completely unreasonable.
Rather, it seems that following a specificational sentence, and a copular sentence
with a description used predicationally, the traditional account makes the right
prediction. Here again, I would suggest that what the pronoun is anaphoric to is
a constant, a discourse referent. Information about this discourse referent, say its
description, can also be inferred in certain contexts, such as in (120), but not all
the time. This type of inference might only be possible in contexts where resuming
the individual alone does not lead to the most coherent interpretation.
What then is the nature of this inference process? Here, I wish to suggest that
cases of pronouns of laziness and paycheck pronouns involve what Nunberg (1979,
1995) has called deferred reference. Basically, the solution here lies in distinguishing
between what is pointed to (the demonstratum) and what is referred to through this
act of pointing (the referent). In discussing examples like (123), Nunberg (1979)
suggests that what links the two are referring functions.
(123) [A waiter points at a ham sandwich out on the counter:]
a. The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.
b. He is sitting at table 20.
The referring function, (315), maps demonstrata into intended referents.
(124) f: D → R
In (124), f is the referring function, D is the domain of the demonstrata and R, the
range of intended referents.
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We also find deferred demonstratives interpreted as unique (definite):
(125) a. [Pointing at the chimney cap of my friend’s house:]
It cost me $1,000.00 to fix that when we moved in.
b. [Pointing at the heron chosen to be this year’s totem animal
in the town 4th of July parade:]
Next year that’ll be a beaver from Lake Artemesia.
As well as deferred demonstratives interpreted as indefinite:
(126) a. [Pointing at a MacBook Air:]
I want that.
b. [Pointing at a Mazda5:]
That’s what I drive.
c. [Gesturing at the groom feeding cake to the bride:]
That is definitely not gonna happen at my wedding!
Going back to the contrast between the traditional example of pronouns of
laziness, (120a), and its counterpart involving a specificational sentence, (121), I
would suggest that cases of pronouns of laziness, and neontological pronouns in
general, involve such deferred reference.
For instance, in (120a), the pronoun picks out the discourse referent introduced
by the DP the president in the previous sentence; the referring function can in turn
use the descriptive material with which the referent was introduced in settling the
intended referent. In (121), the discourse referent resumed by the pronoun was itself
74
introduced by a pronoun, devoid of descriptive content, and so the referring function
does not have access to any extra descriptive material to yield a different intended
referent. Basically, the anaphoric relation is not directly to the description, as in
D-type approaches; rather, the inference obtains by means of the referring function,
that is, the accessing of the description is mediated by the access to the discourse
referent in such cases. Another way to put it would be that rather than going from
types to tokens, as suggested by the D-type approach, we go from tokens to types.
2.5 Summing Up
In this chapter, I have argued that the sense-anaphoric approaches, D-type ap-
proaches, to the representation of anaphoric pronouns both overgenerate and under-
generate. Syntactic D-type approaches have trouble coping with the cases of event
anaphora, deep anaphora, and split antecedents. They undergenerate. Both the
less restricted semantic D-type approach, and the syntactic D-type approach have
issues with examples involving several discourse antecedents, and simple variation
on the traditional pronoun of laziness examples involving specificational sentences.
They overgenerate.
Rather, the representation adopted under the reference-anaphoric view, dy-
namic approaches, where pronouns stand for discourse referents (Kartunnen 1969),
or set variables (Nouwen 2003), is better suited. For this reason, I will adopt the
following syntax and semantics for pronouns:
(127) Set Variable Pronouns
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a. Syntax: [D they ]
b. Semantics: J theyiKg = g(i), where i is a (potentially singleton) set.
Furthermore, this is the anaphoric representation I will assume for the cases




As discussed in chapter 2, anaphoric uses of so-called noun phrase ellipsis differs
interestingly from anaphoric pronouns. In this chapter, I will again use these dis-
tinctions as a guide through the possible space of analysis.
One striking distinction is the fact that cases of ellipsis allow for stranding
of various syntactic phrases which simply cannot co-occur with pronouns. In this
chapter, I will follow Merchant (2001), amongst many others, in assuming a deletion
approach to ellipsis. The stranded material is thought to survive either because of
a movement operation (internal merge) applied prior to deletion, a PF interface
operation; or simply because it is attached higher in the DP than the deleted phrase
it modifies or combines with. However, English contrasts with languages like French
where in some instances adjectival modifiers can be stranded. Both this language
internal, and cross-linguistic distinctions will be addressed here and in the next
chapter.
Other interesting distinctions pertain to the meanings the elided constituents
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may have. As we will see, in discourse segments involving a plurality of possible
antecedents for the ellipsis site, the elided constituent has the antecedent distri-
bution of a plural pronoun rather than what we would expect of an elided NP
constituent. Further, I will address the impossibility of anaphoric ellipsis to have
events as antecedents. This fact was found particularly puzzling given that, contra
Hankamer and Sag (1976), ellipsis in the nominal domain can routinely behave like
deep anaphora.
In this chapter, I will propose that a proper account of these various facts
requires that we rethink what we traditionally think of as NPE as a collection
of distinct types of deletion and anaphoric expressions. Specifically, I will argue
that two major types of deletion/anaphor are at work, namely the deletion of a
partitive including a plural pronoun, partitive ellipsis (PartE); and an anaphor of
category N, with contrastive requirement, overt in English (one-anaphora), but
with a covert counterpart in French, e.g. contrastive anaphor (ContrA). Here, I will
mostly focus on PartE, and come back to ContrA in the next chapter. As we will
see, both approaches fall under the reference-anaphoric approach, rather than the
sense-anaphoric one.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, in §3.1, I briefly revisit previous
treatments of noun phrase ellipsis. Then, in §3.2, I offer my analysis of PartE and
present both semantic and syntactic arguments in its favor. I will also introduce
ContrA, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.
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3.1 A Brief History of Nothing
Within generative linguistics, work on ellipsis has mainly focused on cases of ellipsis
in the clausal or verbal domain (Jackendoff 1972, 1977, Zagona 1982, 1988a, 1988b,
Lasnik 1995, amongst others). With respect to ellipsis in the DP, most approaches
developed are syntactic, and aimed at identifying the exact syntactic conditions
under which ellipsis of a noun phrase is licensed and identified (Lobeck 1995, Sleeman
1996, Gengel 2007, Alexiadou and Gengel 2011, Corver and van Koppen 2009, 2011,
Yoshida et al. 2012).
In this dissertation, I will not be concerned all that much about the licensing
conditions on ellipsis within the DP. The licensing question in essence pertains to
the mediation role that syntax is taken to play between the sound and meaning
components of grarmmar (PF and LF under the minimalist program). This question
is distinct from the identification question, although identified under some theories
such as Government and Binding (Chomsky 1981).
The question of identification pertains to what has gone missing, if anything,
and, perhaps, how it can be retrieved by a discourse participant. This is the question
I will mostly focus on in this chapter.
3.1.1 When Nothing Hides Something
As made salient by a recent series of work by Stainton (2006) and Merchant (2004,
2010), the term ‘ellipsis’ can stand for a variety of formally distinct phenomena re-
lated to different ways of communicating sentential (propositional) content; namely
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syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic.
(128) Three senses of ‘sentence’ (Stainton 2006:31)
a. sentencesyntactic: an expression with a certain kind of structure/form
b. sentencesemantic: an expression with a certain kind of content/meaning
c. sentencepragmatic: an expression with a certain kind of use
The syntactic view is what most linguists tend to assume; namely that the
constituent which has undergone ellipsis is present in the syntax, the semantic, and
understood in the pragmatic component, but has undergone deletion on its way
from syntax to phonology (PF).
The semantic view has been more famously fleshed out by Culicover and Jack-
endoff (2005). Broadly speaking, it contends that, at least in some cases, the missing
element or constituent is not present in the syntax, but rather retrieved through a
contextual variable in the semantic representation. Thus, this account of ellipsis
shares fundamental features with the semantic approaches to anaphoric pronouns
discussed in the previous chapter.
The pragmatic view is perhaps the most unfamiliar and unsettling to the
linguist. It holds that it is possible to utter language fragments, ungrammatical
fragments under the strictest theories of Grammar, to perform fully fledged ‘speech
acts’ such as assertions.
I qualify this last possibility of unsettling as its existence complicates our the-
orizing about ellipsis, as well as the shape of the arguments required to establish the
more theoretically loaded claims that ellipsissyntactic and ellipsissemantic are possible,
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and required. Hence, a few comments on this possibility are in order.
The possibility of the pragmatic view is compatible with the not uncontro-
versial assumptions of contextualism (see for instance Cappelen and Lepore 2004,
Recanati 2010, and references therein). After Grice’s work on implicatures, it is
understood that linguistic expressions can be used to convey two types of mean-
ing: both the conventional meaning of the expression used (often called sentence
meaning or literal meaning), and also further content the speaker means in using
the expression, which he expects the speaker can work out given the circumstances
of the conversation.
Stainton argues for the possibility of ellipsispragmatic by considering a number of
cases involving language fragments of different types.1 Crucially, none of the cases
are manifestly derivable from a sentencesyntactic of which some part has undergone
ellipsis.
(129) Properties applied to a manifest object
a. Sanjay and Silvia are loading up a van. Silvia is looking for a missing
table leg. Sanjay says, ‘On the stoop’.
b. Anita and Sheryl are at the cottage, looking out over the lake. Watch-
ing a boat go by, Anita says, ‘Moving pretty fast!’
c. Jack holds up a letter and says, ‘From Spain!’
d. A car dealer points at a car and says, ‘Driven exactly 10,000km.’
1I will not go into the specifics of Stainton (2006)’s version of pragmatic ellipsis, but I refer the
reader to Merchant (2010) for a critical discussion of the possibility.
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e. On a bottle of cold medicine: ‘Recommended for ages 6 and
older.’
f. She looked up at Nok Lek, who watched the forest nervously. “I told
you, one of Anthony Carroll’s best men.” (Daniel Mason, The
piano tuner, Vintage: New York, 2002, p.159)
(130) Individuals as arguments of a manifest property
a. A woman is coming through a door, and a linguist turns to her friend
and identifies the new arrival by saying, ‘Barbara Partee.’
b. A girl is doling out jam and says, ‘Chunks of strawberries.’ Her
mother nods and says, ‘Rob’s mom.’
c. After some weeks one summer of unusually cold weather in Manitoba
(a part of Canada where the summers are usually warm), Alice, look-
ing at the sky, says to Bruce (who has just returned from a trip to
Spain), ‘Nova Scotia.’
d. Edgar didn’t have time to ask what this was, for at that instant,
from behind the stage rose a plaintive wail. He caught his breath. It
was the same tune he had heard that night when the streamer had
stopped on the river. He had forgotten it until now. “The ngo-gyin,
the song of mourning,” said Nash-Burnham at his side. (Daniel
Mason, The piano tuner, Vintage: New York, 2002, p.140)
(131) Quantifiers as arguments of a manifest property
a. I’m at a linguistics meeting, talking with Andy. There are some empty
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seats around a table. I point at one and say, ‘An editor of Natural
Language Semantics’. (p.209)
b. At a bar: ‘Three pints of lager.’
c. He continued to walk, the children following at a distance. . . . At the
side of the road, a pair of men [ who are Shan, and know no English,
-JM] sat. . . One of the men pointed to the group of children and said
something, and Edgar answered, “Yes, quite a lot of children.”
and they both laughed although neither understood a word the other
had said. (Daniel Mason, The piano tuner, Vintage: New York, 2002,
p.235)
Merchant (2004, 2010) suggests that the first two sets of cases here could
perhaps be handled through some special type of non-constituent deletion as the
following:
(132) a. <It’s> on the stoop.
b. <That’s> Moving pretty fast!
c. <It’s> from Spain!
d. <It’s been> driven exactly 10,000km.
e. <It’s> recommended for ages 6 and older.
f. <He’s> one of Anthony Carroll’s best men.
(133) a. <That’s> Barbara Partee.
b. <It’s> Rob’s mom.
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c. <It’s> Nova Scotia.
d. <It’s> the ngo-gyin, the song of mourning.
However, such a solution could not account for the third set of ‘fragments’
involving quantificational expressions:
(134) a. ?? It’s an editor of Linguistics and Philosophy.
b. ?? It’s/they are three pints of lager.
c. <There/they are> quite a lot of children.
Further, this type of account is useless with respect to a number of cases
brought to bear on the question by Stainton:
(135) A father is worried that his daughter will spill her chocolate milk. The glass
is really full, and she is quite young, and prone to accidents. He says, ‘Both
hands!’
Obviously this cannot be ‘That’s both hands!’ underlyingly, as Merchant concedes,
along with the likely possibility that ‘bare’ subsentential phrases (such as DPs)
be generable on their own by the syntactic component of the grammar. After all,
syntactic principles pertaining to constituent ordering still apply in fragments: the
father in the example above could not have uttered “*Hands both” to convey
the same content. Language specific rules pertaining to the ordering of constituents
within the phrasal fragments used do apply.
Nevertheless, Merchant (2010) stresses the gravity of the epistemic challenges
posed by Stainton, and proposes that a semantic ellipsis treatment is plausible for a
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number of the cases presented by Stainton (2006). I will not delve into the specific of
such an account for Stainton’s fragments, but rather move on to the cases of ellipsis
within DP to be discussed in this chapter:
(136) Ten boys walked in the room.
[ Many/Some/Two ] sat down.
I will be assuming here that something is underlyingly present in the syntax,
although not pronounced. Further, I will assume that the structures considered
involve syntactic constituents which are deleted on their way to pronunciation (at
the PF interface), but are retrievable as syntactically present at the LF interface.
Jackendoff (1971) identifies a number of ways in which the (syntactic) phe-
nomenon of ellipsis and that of gapping may differ (although see Yoshida et al 2011
for an ellipsis treatment). As pointed out by Lobeck (1995), these properties also
hold of ellipsis within the DP.
First, the ellipsis site can occur phrase final and can co-occur with either
coordinate or subordinate clauses:
(137) a. John calls on these students because he is irritated with [those ].
b. We tasted many wines, and I thought that [some ] were extremely
dry.
Second, the ellipsis site can occur in a cataphoric, or backward anaphoric,
configuration with respect to its intended antecedent:
(138) a. Because the professor is irritated with [those ], she will only call
on these students.
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b. Even though Lee thought that [most ] were extremely dry, we
bought the Italian wines anyway.
Third and finally, that it involves the deletion of a phrase and not that of a
head, as is taken to be evidenced by a ban on stranded complements:
(139) a. * Because the professor didn’t like [those of chemistry], she gave
only the students of physics achievement awards.
b. * Lee thinks that [most of Italy] are too dry, and that the wines of
France are the only ones worth drinking.
This last property is very important. The impossibility of stranding a complement,
coupled with the possibility of stranding an adjunct (140) is basically what rules out
a pragmatic treatment here. Under a pragmatic account of this phenomenon, noth-
ing would require a grammatical distinction such as that of adjunct vs. complement.
Rather, this distinction is to be captured grammatically.
(140) Because the professor didn’t like [those from Swabia], she gave only the
students from Hamburg achievement awards.
This sensitivity to the complement/adjunct distinction does not however dis-
tinguish between syntactic and semantic accounts.
For such cases, a semantic ellipsis solution could also be pursued. Intransitive
determiners to which adjuncts, but not noun complements can be attached, could
be involved. The adjuncts could be taken as modifying the contextual variable often
taken to restrict quantificational expressions (see for instance von Fintel 1994).
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I will not pursue this semantic approach here, but rather follow a syntactic
solution, where the structure elided is covertly present.
One reason to assume structure in the cases considered pertains to the pres-
ence of stranded modifiers which are not usually present in the absence of NP-like
constituents. As stated above, I take it, following Abney (1987), that DPs con-
taining a determiner-head alone are possible. That is, intransitive determiners are
lexically available to the language user. This is what I assume for pronouns such as
it, as represented in (141).
(141) [DP [D it ] ]
Such bare D-heads do not, however, combine with adjuncts that typically
modify NPs:
(142) a. I saw [DP him/it (*[PP from Swabia])]
b. I saw [DP Many [PP from Swabia ] ]
And so, under the current approach, what distinguishes (142a) from (142b), what
licenses the presence of the adjunct from Swabia in one case but not the other, is
the underlying presence of the kind of syntactic constituents taking such adjuncts.
I will come back to other reasons to discard a semantic ellipsis treatment in favor
of a syntactic one below. As I will propose in the next section, I take it that the
constituents elided in the cases considered are Partitive Phrases (PartPs).
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3.2 Part and Parcel of Eliding Partitives
This section argues that bare determiners as in the sentence ‘Many sat down.’ should
be analyzed as involving the elision of a partitive phrase, as opposed to a noun phrase
as is commonly assumed (Lobeck 1991, 1995; Bernstein 1993; Panagiotidis 2003a,
2003b; Alexiadou and Gengel 2007; Corver and van Koppen 2009, 2011). This
analysis is supported by (i) the anaphoric interpretation of the bare determiners in
context; (ii) the syntax of bare determiners; and (iii) deep event anaphora. Further,
the adoption of partitive ellipsis comes with the suggestion that partitive DPs do
not involve null intermediary noun phrases (cf. Jackendoff 1977, Sauerland and
Yatsushiro 2004, and Ionin et al 2006), but rather that determiners can take partitive
phrases as internal arguments (Matthewson 2001). I will also suggest that the
existence of such a phenomenon militates in favor of a meaning isomorphy approach
to the licensing of ellipsis (Merchant 2001), rather than structural isomorphy (Fiengo
and May 1994).
It is commonly assumed2 that cases of bare determiners in languages like
English (143a) and French (143b) involve the ellipsis of a noun phrase (NPE).
(143) a. Ten boys walked in the room.
Many boys sat down.
b. Dix garçons sont entrés dans la pièce.
Plusieurs garçons se sont assis.
2Lobeck 1991, 1995; Bernstein 1993; Panagiotidis 2003; Alexiadou and Gengel 2011; Corver
and van Koppen 2009, 2011.
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Here, I will argue that such constructions involve the ellipsis of a partitive phrase
containing a plural anaphoric pronoun (PartE), as in (144a, 144b).
(144) a. Ten boys walked in the room.
Many of them sat down.
b. Dix garçons sont entrés dans la pièce.
Plusieurs d’entre eux se sont assis.
I further propose that this partitive phrase is directly taken as internal argument by
the determiner. To achieve this semantically, I assume the partitive phrase to be of
type 〈e, t〉, and encode proper partitivity, as suggested by Barker (1998):
(145) a. JofK = λx. λy. y < x
b. Jof them1 Kg = λy. y < g(1)
I present evidence for this approach from the interpretation of anaphora in
§3.2.1; evidence from syntax in §3.2.2; and evidence from deep event anaphora in
§3.2.5. Then, in §3.2.6, I discuss the underlying structure of partitives. In §3.2.7
and §3.2.8, I discuss issues with mass partitives, and other apparent types of ellipsis,
which could be taken to challenge the current proposal. Finally, I broach the topic
of ellipsis licensing in §3.2.9 and conclude in §3.3.
3.2.1 Evidence from Anaphora
Examples such as (143) and (144) above cannot distinguish between the NPE ap-
proach and the PartE approach, on the account that a single discourse referent is
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available in context. Assuming that an elided phrase obtains the same interpreta-
tion as its overt counterpart (call this assumption meaning parity), the NPE and
PartE approaches make the same predictions with respect to anaphoric readings in
such simple contexts.
However, the interpretation of ellipsis in more complex contexts, involving a
plurality of discourse referents, supports the PartE analysis and is incompatible with
the NPE analysis.
To see this, consider the discourse segment in (146). There, three different
reference sets are introduced, corresponding to the boyscouts already present in
class (X), the girlscouts (Y), and the ten boys who later walked in (Z).
(146) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [Many ] sat down.
Can mean [Many Z] , or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
c. = [Many of them] sat down.
Can mean [Many Z], or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
d. 6= Many boys sat down.
Can only mean [Many X ∪ Z]
Considering (146b), we see that the readings available for the ellipsis site, the sets
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restricting the quantifier in context, are just those available for an overt partitive
phrase containing a plural anaphoric pronoun, as in (146c); namely, the most salient
reference set, consisting of the young boys who just walked in (Z), or the set of all
individuals available in context (X∪Y∪Z). Crucially these readings are distinct
from the sentence involving the overt NP boys, in (146d), which leads to quantifi-
cation over the boys present in the context (X∪Z). Following the meaning parity
assumption, PartE makes the correct predictions here, whereas NPE does not.
Further, to support the claim that PartE involves an embedded plural pronoun,
note that the ‘anaphoric reach’ of the ellipsis site in such cases is the same as that
of a simple anaphoric plural pronoun, as seen in the previous chapter:
(147) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [They] sat down. Can refer to [Z], or [X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot refer to [X ∪ Z]
Here, the plural pronoun can refer back to the reference sets quantified over by
the bare quantifier in (146) above. Again, it crucially cannot refer to the set of
individuals picked out by the overt definite description the boys in this context.
Cases of ellipsis in donkey split antecedent constructions also militate in favor
of the PartE approach over the NPE approach:
(148) a. If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he surely likes [one (of
them/*wife and(/or) donkey)] better.
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b. If a man has a wife who owns a donkey, he likes [the two (of
them/*wife and donkey)] equally.3
In (148), only an overt partitive phrase would be acceptable in the ellipsis site, and
yield the desired reading in context.4 There are no noun phrases which would be
appropriate in this context.
I conclude here that evidence from anaphora strongly supports the PartE
approach, and is incompatible with the common NPE view.
3.2.2 Evidence from Syntax
Support in favor of the PartE approach can also be found in the syntactic distri-
bution of the determiners allowing ellipsis in their scope (or c-command domain).
This section discusses different types of evidence from English and French.
3.2.3 Ellipsis Licensing Determiners (ELDs)
In English, there is a split between Determiners which license ellipsis in their scope
and those which do not:5
(149) A group of boys walked in the room.
a. ELD
[Most/Each/Some/One/All/Many/Few/Both ] sat down.
3In such cases, using the type of copy mechanism proposed for NPE in Elbourne (2005), based
on Fiengo and May (1994), would not yield the desired result.
4I am grateful to Philippe Schlenker for pointing out such cases.
5See Jackendoff (1977) and Chomsky (1981) for early discussion of this generalization.
92
b. Non-ELD
*[Every/The/A/No ] sat down.
Under an NPE approach, it is unclear what could account for this arbitrary distinc-
tion. Why could a noun phrase be elided following the determiners in (149a), but not
those in (149b)? The PartE approach on the other hand predicts this generalization.
The determiners in (149a) can take partitives, but not those in (149b):
(150) a. [Most/Each/Some/One/All/Many/Few/Both (of them)] sat
down.
b. * [Every/The/A/No (of them)] sat down.
If we assume that only partitive phrases can be elided, then we can straightforwardly
account for this distribution.
3.2.3.1 *Stranded Adjectives
Adding a prenominal modifier to all the licit examples of the paradigm renders them
illicit:
(151) * [Most/Each/Some/One/All/Many/Few/Both tall ] sat down.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, adding a modifier to the illicit ones does not change their
status:
(152) * [Every/The/A/No tall ] sat down.
All else being equal, the stranding of prenominal modifiers is what we would
expect for cases of NPE. This is in fact what we find in French, (153), and a number
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‘I met some students, and the young ones wanted to speak with me.’7
I return to this cross-linguistic distinction in §3.2.4.1.
This impossibility to strand adjectival modifiers in English can be further
contrasted with the possibility to strand adjuncts:
(155) 10 boys walked in the room.
a. [Some [PartPof them] [from Swabia]] sat down.
b. [Some [PartP of them] [from Swabia]] sat down.
6See for instance Lobeck (1995), and Sleeman (1996).
7The French cases are originally from Herschensohn (1978); the Dutch, Afrikaans, and Frisian
from Corver and van Koppen (2011); the German from Lobeck (1995).
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c. * [Some tall [PartPof them]] sat down.
d. * [Some tall [PartPof them]] sat down.
Here again, the PartE approach can help us get a grip on the English facts discussed
so far. The adjuncts which can be stranded under ellipsis can co-occur with partitive
phrases (155a,b). The adjectives which cannot be stranded simply cannot co-occur
with partitive phrases (155c,d).
Note that the modifiers stranded under ellipsis, such as relative clauses and
prepositional phrases, can, and in some cases must, be attached higher in the DP
than the partitive phrase. This is made obvious from the fact that these modifiers
cannot ‘move’ with a preposed partitive phrase (Jackendoff 1977, p.109):




 aren’t here anymore.




 that you met aren’t here anymore.
Thus I take it that only phrases which can modify partitive phrases can be stranded
under PartE. Another fact supporting this conclusion is that plural pronouns cannot
combine with such adjuncts, and so in (157b), the modifier cannot be embedded in
the PartP.
(157) a. * [They from Swabia] sat down.
b. [Most [of them] from Swabia] sat down.
As an interim conclusion, I assume that apparent NPE, as in French and
German, can strand adjectival modifiers; I further take the impossibility to strand
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adjectives as an indicator that no NPE has taken place. I will, however, present
some evidence below, in §3.2.4.1, which casts doubt on the idea that proper NPE
even exists in languages such as French.
3.2.4 Evidence from French
















































































‘Two/Three of them sat down.’
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In fact, some determiners which allow ellipsis can only take a PartP argu-
























































‘Most boys sat down.’
It is then by necessity that in such cases a PartP, and not an NP is elided.
We can also verify that the cases in (158) are interpreted as if a PartP con-
















































































Here, just as in the cases presented in English above, the interpretation of the ellipsis
site is equivalent to that of an overt PartP containing a plural pronoun, and not to
that of an overt NP.
3.2.4.1 Another Type of ‘Ellipsis’ in French
As mentioned, French seems to allow the stranding of adjectival modifiers. This
fact appears to be compatible with a traditional treatment of these cases of ellipsis
in terms of NPE. However, here I will follow the proposal that such cases are to be
treated on par with English one-anaphora (162b):8
(162) a. French
J’ai vu les garçons dans la cour. [Les *(grands) ] jouaient avec [les
*(petits) ].
b. English
I saw the boys play in the yard. [The *(tall) ones] played with [the
*(small) ones].
A peculiar fact about such constructions is that in both the English and French
constructions, a modifier, typically adjectival, must be present (Halliday and Hasan
1976). This is also highlighted in (162).
8See Alexiadou and Gengel (2011), and Corver and van Koppen (2009, 2011) for recent
proposals.
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I wish to suggest that in the French cases we are not faced with NPE either,
but rather with a null anaphoric pro-noun, the equivalent of one in English. I dub
this type of anaphora Contrastive Anaphora (ContrA). The decision not to treat
these cases as involving NPE comes from the fact that the anaphoric reach of these
expressions is the same as that of PartE in complex contexts (in English here, the
same holds for French):9
(163) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [The tall ones] sat down.
Can mean [the tall Zs] , or [the tall X ∪ Y ∪ Zs]
Cannot mean [the tall X ∪ Zs]
Here again, if we were faced with NPE, or N′-substitution, of ‘boys’, we would expect
the anaphoric reference to be to all the boys present in the context. Yet this is not
the reading we find. I will discuss this anaphor in more details in the next chapter.
3.2.5 Evidence from Deep Event Anaphora
Further evidence for PartE can be found in its interaction with deep anaphora (Han-
kamer and Sag 1976) and event anaphora.
It has been known for some time that deep anaphora is generally possible in
9I am grateful to Uli Sauerland for bringing this fact to light.
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the cases I identify here as PartE:10
(164) [Matt snatches an egg from Ian on stage, and smashes it on the floor]
Matt: Don’t worry folks, he has [several/many/more/some more ].
However, it is rather strange that deep anaphora to events is not equally
possible. Consider (165a), involving PartE, which contrasts with the acceptable
case in (165b), involving a singular anaphoric pronoun.
(165) [While looking at an arguing couple]:
a. * [Some/Most/All ] happen right after Valentine’s day.
b. It always happens right after Valentine’s day.
Under the PartE approach, this peculiarity can be explained by two things.
The first part of the explanation is the fact that plural pronouns cannot refer
to implied events (Neale 1988):
(166) a. Psmith saw every student leave, but Maja didn’t see it/#them.
(Neale 1988)
b. John talked and Mary danced. It/ #They took place in this room.
In both examples in (166), only singular pronouns can be used to make anaphoric
reference to what is clearly understood as pluralities of events.
The second part of the explanation is the fact that the internal argument of
partitives must have proper subparts (Barker 1998):
10This examples is taken from Chisholm (2002).
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(167) * Many of the boy
Under Barker (1998)’s analysis, this is ensured by treating the partitive ‘of’ as
encoding proper partitivity (cf. Ladusaw 1982):
(168) JofPART K ≡ λx.λy.[y < x]
As a result of this denotation, the first argument of the partitive must have proper
subparts; that is, it must either be plural or mass.
Putting the pieces together, we can now explain the impossibility of (deep)
event anaphora under PartE. Given that anaphoric pronouns referring to implicit
pluralities of events can only be singular, they cannot be embedded into a partitive,
and so PartE cannot have an implicit event as antecedent when combined with count
partitives (Ionin et al 2006).
Under the NPE approach, the impossibility of cases like (165) is rather mys-
terious. Surely NPE could resolve pragmatically an event noun like argument, if it
can resolve a concrete entity noun like egg in (164). It is very unclear to me what
exactly this distinction could be attributed to under such an account. Without a
resolution of this issue, I take it that the facts pertaining to deep event anaphora
presented here support PartE over NPE.
3.2.6 The Structure of Partitives
So far, I have not been precise with respect to the syntactic structure I assume
for partitive constructions. Two main views can be found in the literature. One
assumes that a covert NP is always present, which is taken as internal argument by
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determiners, and takes the PartP as complement (Jackendoff 1977; Sauerland and
Yatsushiro 2005; Ionin, Matushansky and Ruys 2006). The second assumes that
determiners combine directly with the PartP, without the presence of an intervening
null NP (Matthewson 2001). Here, I opt for the second view, and assume the
structure in (169) in cases of PartE.
(169) [DP Most [PartP of [DP the boys] ] ] (Matthewson 2001)
11
In essence, my suggestion is that certain determiners (those that can appear
bare) can take either NPs or (partitive) PPs as arguments. This approach to de-
terminers finds a parallel in the clausal domain in verbs like rob which select for
specific PP arguments:
(170) John robbed Mary of everything she had.
The determiners that can combine directly with PartPs are to be contrasted with
every, the, a and no which only take NP arguments in English.
My choice of this syntax is based on two reasons. First, the assumed covert
noun cannot typically be overt:
(171) * Most boys of the boys.
Second, this structure can readily account for the ban on adjectival modi-
fiers discussed above, given that such adjectives can only modify nouns, and not
11Here, although I adopt the syntactic structure proposed by Matthewson, I do not adopt her
treatment of the partitive ‘of’ as semantically vacuous.
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PartPs.12,13
(172) * Most tall (of them) sat down.
The alternative to this approach would be to assume that a null NP is always
present:
(173) [DPMost [NP 〈boys〉 [PartP of [DP the boys] ] ] ]
(Sauerland and Yatsushiro 2005; Ionin, Matushansky and Ruys 2006)14
Under this view, the null NP could then be the target of deletion, and perhaps
fall under an NPE treatment. However, this would require an explanation of the
impossibility of cases like (171) and (172). It would also fall short of explaining why
all types of NPE are not generally possible. In other words, under this approach,
cases of NPE would be required to have a PartP argument containing a plural
anaphoric pronoun. I have little to say about this alternative, other than point to
the generalizations discussed above.
To summarize, even though PartPs appear to be combinable with both NPs
and a subset of determiners, only PartPs can be elided, an not NPs with a partitive
complement.
12For alternative views cast in X’-theory and HPSG see Jackendoff 1977 and Nerbonne, Iida and
Ladusaw 1989.
13Of course, I also allow for the possibility that partitive PPs can be complements to nouns (and
combine through predicate modification):
vii. ?Armando only likes three books of the books I read.
14See the appendix for a brief discussion of Ionin, Matushansky and Ruys 2006.
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3.2.7 Issues with Mass Partitives
Here I wish to highlight a puzzle pertaining to mass partitives, which comes about
under the PartE approach. First, note that mass partitives appear to be subject to
PartE:15
(174) George gave me wine, and. . .
a. Some of it was spilled on the white tablecloth.
b. Some of it was spilled on the white tablecloth.
However, cases involving coercion of a count noun as a mass noun, universal
grinder (Pelletier 1975, pp. 5-6), cannot undergo ellipsis.
(175) The boys came back from playing outside.
a. Most of them were covered in mud.
b. Most of them were covered in mud.
(176) The boy came back from playing outside.
a. ? Most of him was covered in mud.
b. * Most of him was covered in mud.
15However, as pointed out to me by Louise McNally, this might not always be the case. As
follow up to (174), contrast the overt ‘Most of it ended up spilled on the white tablecloth’ with its
elided counterpart ‘?Most ended up spilled on the white tablecloth.’. If this contrast is robust, then
we would be required to distinguish the determiners allowing for the deletion of a mass partitive.
At the moment however, I am rather unclear on what could be the basis of this distinction.
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In (175), we have a typical case of PartE, where a partitive containing a plural
pronoun is elided. In (176) we have a case involving a singular pronoun anaphoric
to a count individual subsequently coerced as mass. There, the overt version in
(176a), although degraded, contrasts sharply with its elided counterpart in (176b),
which is clearly unacceptable.
The same contrast holds of partitives containing an event-referring pronoun:
(177) James danced himself to death.
a. ? Still, most of it was enjoyable.
b. * Still, most of it was enjoyable.
This is rather puzzling. It appears that an overt expression must be present for
the universal grinder or event reference to take place. Perhaps the type of coercion
involved in turning count expressions into mass meanings is similar in nature to
what is involved in making anaphoric reference to implied events. But I can offer
little more than speculations here, and hope that future work will shed light on this
issue.
3.2.8 Other Apparent Types of Ellipsis
To the best of my knowledge, there are, in English two other apparent types of
ellipsis which do not readily fall under PartE or ContrA. The first, well-known,
involves bare possessives. The second, involves bare determiners. I discuss them in
turn in this section.
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3.2.8.1 Bare Possessives
Bare possessives are usually assumed to involve NPE:16
(178) I prefer Mary’s book to John’s
Such cases do not seem to involve PartE or ContrA:
(179) a. * I prefer Mary’s book to John’s of them.
b. ?? I prefer Mary’s book to John’s one.
There does seem to be a contrasting alternatives requirement for this type of con-
struction to be licit, and so perhaps a variant of the ContrA approach could handle
such cases.
However, here I want to challenge the assumption that ellipsis is involved at
all in such cases. First consider the following discourse segment:
(180) a. I threw a party last week and specified no kids allowed.
Still, at the very beginning John brought his three sons.
Then, two hours later Mary showed up with her three daughters.
b. In the end, I preferred Mary’s daughters by far.
c. * In the end, I preferred Mary’s by far.
On the basis of the contrast between (180b) and (180c), there seems to be a homo-
geneity requirement for bare possessives, which does not hold in overt cases.17 This
16See for instance Yoshida et al (2012) for a recent discussion.
17Another curious fact should be noted here. This homogeneity requirement holds of linguistic
antecedent, as seen in (180), but does not hold for pragmatically controlled cases. Consider a
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goes against the meaning parity assumption introduced above. That is, I see no rea-
son why such a requirement should hold under NPE. Further, given the possibility
of deep anaphora under ellipsis mentioned above, it is unclear why a noun phrase
like children couldn’t be accommodated in such contexts to satisfy this apparent
requirement.
An NPE account would also need to explain why adjectival modifiers cannot
be stranded in such cases, given that they can appear overtly:
(181) a. John’s beautiful daughter
b. * John’s beautiful
I believe another argument against an ellipsis account can be made on the
basis of a missing ambiguity. Barker (1995) points out cases like the following:
(182) At the kiddy AI fair, I liked the three Japanese children’s robots.
This example can be read as either involving three japanese children, and an un-
specified plurality of robots which they made. Perhaps not as salient is also the
reading where there are three robots which were made by an unspecified plurality
of japanese children, perhaps a whole class. Under Barker’s analysis, this is cashed
out by assuming that both the possessor and the possessee have a variable, which
context where John walks in the room accompanied by his three sons, and then Mary walks in
the room accompanied by her three daughters. In such a context, I can turn to Bill and whisper
“I prefer Mary’s”, where what is understood is something like “I prefer Mary’s children.”. It
thus appears that the grammatically controlled bare possessive is more restricted here than its
pragmatically controlled counterpart.
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can be bound by the raised quantifier.18 With this in mind, consider the following
example:
(183) At the kiddy AI fair, I preferred the three Japanese children’s robots to the
six American children’s.
Here, I believe that the bare possessive is unambiguous, involving exactly six ameri-
can children. If this is the case, it can be accounted for by assuming that no possessee
DP has been elided, which would have contained a bindable variable.19 But, regard-
less of the specific treatment given to this ambiguity, the lack of ambiguity in (183)
would also run afoul of the meaning parity assumption.
Assuming that cases of bare possessives do not in fact involve ellipsis can
prevent us from stipulating a special instance of NPE (or even DPE under the
Abney-Barker syntactic analysis).
3.2.8.2 Maximal Set Anaphora and Ellipsis
Other cases have been pointed out to me which do not clearly involve PartE:20
(184) Twenty boys were in the playground when [ten (more) (? of them)] arrived.
(185) A: He didn’t see two unicorns.
18I am aware that Barker is not so categorical about these cases, but I avoid discussing the
complications due to a lack of space. The reader is referred to Barker’s work for a more complete
picture.
19Note here that Barker argues in favor of the spec-of-DP syntactic analysis originating from
Abney (1987).
20I am grateful to two anonymous SALT reviewers for pointing out these cases.
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a. B: No, he saw three .
b. ? B: No, he saw three of them.
Here it appears that the overt counterparts to the cases involving ellipsis are some-
what degraded. However, even though I am not certain as to what the source of the
degradation might be here, I am not convinced that such cases warrant the adoption
of NPE, or N′-ellipsis. A possibility here might be to treat the elided partitives as
involving plural demonstratives, as they appear more acceptable in such cases21
In any event, I believe that such cases do involve PartE, where the plural
pronoun is related not to the reference set of the antecedent, but to the maximal
set (Nouwen 2003). Consider the following cases which make this type of reading
salient.22
(186) Few MPs attended the meeting,
a. but [most ] attended the happy hour afterwards.
b. but most of them attended the happy hour afterwards.
The challenge we are thus faced with here is to figure out the exact environ-
ments in which maximal set anaphora is possible. The resolution of this problem
is one of the central issues for the account proposed here. So far, we have seen
a lot of evidence to the effect that the sense-anaphoric approach to ellipsis in DP
overgenerates. We have also seen that syntactic and semantic generalizations point
to a PartE analysis, rather than an NPE one. Given the possibility of cases like
21I am grateful to Philippe Schlenker for this suggestion.
22The example is based on one of Nouwen’s, originally involving a plural pronoun alone.
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(184) and (185), our task becomes to figure out where and how the appearance of
anaphoric linking to a noun meaning can obtain.
3.2.9 It’s egiven!
Fiengo and May (1994) have famously argued for a principle of structural isomorphy
as involved in the licensing of ellipsis. The core idea being that ellipsis can only be
licensed if a ‘structurally identical’ antecedent to the elided constituent can be found
in the relevant discourse context. However, such structural isomorphy clearly does
not hold for PartE, given that in none of the cases discussed here was there a
partitive phrase antecedent.
Rather, a principle of meaning isomorphy, as argued for by Merchant (2001)
would be appropriate here. Merchant suggests that an elided constituent must be
egiven in order for the ellipsis to be licensed. This basically requires that an elided
constituent, raised to a propositional meaning (by means of existential quantification
over unsaturated arguments), both entails and be entailed by its antecedent.
And so, in (187), we need to verify the entailments in (188):
(187) Ten boys walked in the room.
Many of them sat down.
(188) a. If there are ten boys (B), then there is a subpart of B (e.g. Jten boysK
entails F-Clo(Jof themK) )
b. If there is a B that has proper subparts, then there is a B (e.g. Jof
themK entails F-Clo(Jten boysK))
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I take these entailments to be trivial here. PartE then favors a meaning isomorphy
approach to the licensing of ellipsis, over a structural isomorphy view.
3.3 Conclusions
I have argued that cases of bare determiner as in (189) involve the ellipsis of a
partitive phrase containing a plural pronoun.
(189) Ten boys walked in the room.
Many of them sat down.
To support this view, I have offered arguments from anaphora, the syntax of these
expressions, and the interaction between deep anaphora and event anaphora. I have
also discussed some possible challenges to this view coming from mass partitives,
bare possessives, and maximal set anaphora.
I see this work as a step towards the strong hypothesis that all cases of cross-
sentential anaphora, or discourse anaphora, involves not the retrieval of syntactic
constituents, but rather the valuation of unsaturated semantic variables, such as
those denoted by pronouns. Here, just as was argued for pronouns in the previous
chapter, a reference-anaphoric approach is better equipped than the alternative
sense-anaphoric approach.
3.3.1 Semantic Ellipsis
Another approach one could have taken here is to treat such cases as involving
ellipsis in the semantics sense. That is, the covert content required for interpretation
111
could have been introduced by means of the contextual restrictions on the relevant
quantificational expressions.
As is well-known, quantificational expressions are contextually restricted:
(190) Everybody knows about GB.
Any context where (190) would be judged as true would be one where the expression
everybody is considered to quantify over a subset of every individual in the world;
presumably one including mostly linguists and language enthusiasts.
There is also good evidence to the effect that the restriction is on the quantifi-
cational expressions themselves, and not just on the domain of quantification itself.
Consider the following example, where the two distinct QPs each man can be taken
as quantifying over two different groups of men, say one on a boat sailing away, and
the other on the shore:
(191) Each man waved at each man.
This could be represented either as a covert syntactic constituent restricting
the determiner or the noun:23
(192) The table is covered with books.
23Such a variable is perhaps required due to instances of apparent syntactic binding of the
contextual restriction:
(1) Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam.
a. Only one class x was so bad that no student in x passed x’s exam.
b. only one class λ2 [t2 was so bad that no f1v2 student passed the f3v2 exam]
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a. [[ the [f1v2 ] table] [is covered with books]] (von Fintel 1994)
b. [the [table [f1v2 ]] [is covered with books]] (Stanley and Szabó 2000)
It could also be represented as a semantic contextual variable part of the lexical
specification of the relevant expressions (Elbourne 2005) or present in the syntax
(Percus 2000, Keshet 2008):
(193) Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant.
a. Σ8 [[every [-one s1 ]] [[is asleep s8 ] and [is being monitored s8 by a
research assistant s8 ]]]
b. λs8 . everyone in s1 is asleep in s8 and being monitored by a research
assistant in s8
At first sight, it seems that this independently motivated account of contextual
restriction on the QPs is readily extendable to the cases of PartE discussed here.
However, I do not adopt such an account for a few reasons.
First, as discussed above, such an account would have to distinguish between
different types of intransitive determiners, where the ones involved in this semantic
version of PartE can take adjunct modifiers, but not others such as the anaphoric
pronouns (e.g. it, they).
Secondly, such an account loses the generalization pertaining to the distinction
between ELDs and Non-ELDs. That is, No, every, and the, are also contextually
restricted. Yet, these expressions do not allow for ellipsis in their scope. Here, one
would have to say that they do not have a possible intransitive instantiation. Under
the PartE approach devised here, whatever prevents these expressions from taking
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a partitive phrase will also be responsible for their inability to appear bare.
Of course, these facts could merely be challenges to a semantic ellipsis ap-
proach. I do not believe that they rule out such an account altogether, and leave it
for later work to establish this possibility.
3.4 Appendix: How Many Ns Can You See?
Ionin, Matushansky & Ruys (2006) argue that partitive phrases can either be com-
plements or adjuncts, where a null NP is found in (194):
(194) [DPTwo [NP 〈boys〉 [PartP of [DP the boys] ] ] ]
The structure in (194b) is required at least for cases involving numerals. This is
due to the privative meaning they assume for numerals such as two. Under their





K = λP sg .{x : ∃Y (Y ∈ part(x) & (|Y | = 2) & ∀z(z ∈ Y → z ∈ P sg))
a. A predicate Q is of type P sg ⇐⇒ ∀x, y ∈ Q(x ≯ y & y ≯ x)
b. part(x) = def {Z : Z is a partition of x}
c. A partition of an aggregate x is a set of aggregates Z such that the
join (sum) of all the elements in Z is equal to x (
∨
Z = x) and for
any two elements, w and v, in Z, the meet of those two elements is
empty (w ∧ v = ∅)
24The denotation is taken from Bale, Gagnon and Khanjian (2011) for notational consistency
with the rest of the discussion.
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Languages such as Turkish where numerals necessarily combine with singular










A syntactic structure for the partitive without a null NP would not be compat-
ible with a numeral in English, on the account that a plural predicate is embedded
in the partitive.
However, Bale, Gagnon and Khanjian (2011) have argued for a different de-
notation for numerals such as two; a subsective denotation in the spirit of Partee
(2004, 2010)’s thesis that all modification is restrictive (and not privative). This
denotation is perfectly compatible with a structure lacking a null NP in partitives,





K = λP pl .{x : x ∈ P pl & ∃Y (Y ∈ part(x) & (|Y | = 2) & ∀z(z ∈ Y →
z ∈MIN(P pl)))
a. A predicate Q is of type P pl ⇐⇒ ∀x, y ∈ Q(x⊕ y = Q)
b. MIN(P ) is defined iff
∀x, y((x, y ∈ P & ¬∃z(z ∈ P & (z ≤ y ∨ z ≤ x)))→ x ∧ y = 0).
when defined MIN(P ) = {x : x ∈ P & ¬∃z(z ≤ x)}.
Support for this denotation comes from the difference between languages such as
English and Turkish in the meaning for the plurally marked and unmarked nouns
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in predicative position.





As mentioned in the previous chapter, French allows for the stranding of adjectival
modifiers in constructions which appear to involve NPE. Here I will follow the
previously made assumption that such cases are to be treated on par with English
one-anaphora (198b):1
(198) a. French
J’ai vu les garçons dans la cour. [Les grands ONEs ] jouaient avec [les
petits ONEs ].
b. English
I saw the boys play in the yard. [The tall ones] played with [the small
ones].
However, I will argue that NPE is not involved in either the French or English
cases. Rather what we find in French is the null contrastive anaphor (henceforth
1See Alexiadou and Gengel (2011), and Corver and van Koppen (2009, 2011) for recent
proposals.
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ContrA; ‘one’ in 198a), the equivalent of the overt English one. A number of
authors also treat English one as an N’ substitute (originally proposed by Ross
1967; see also McCawley 1988 and Radford 1988); my arguments against an NPE
treatment will hold equally against a syntactic substitution account. As we will see,
this contrastive anaphor has the same anaphoric reach as pronouns of category D,
but is of category N; it is specified as count (and not mass); and it must appear in
a DP involving contrastive focus.
In this chapter, I will justify this departure from the traditional NPE treat-
ment, §4.2.1, and discuss a number of properties of this anaphor. Specifically, that
it is count, §4.2.2; and that it requires the presence of contrastive alternatives in
the context, §4.2.3. I will then propose a syntactic analysis which strongly borrows
from the work of Corver and van Koppen (2009), §4.3. In §4.4, I will discuss other
homophonic expressions in English from which it should be distinguished. Finally,
in §4.5 I will argue that ContrA is to be distinguished from PartE in French, going
against the common view which assimilates both types of phenomena under an NPE
treatment.
4.1 What Others Have Made of one
There are two main analyses of one generally adopted in the generative litera-
ture. Under the analysis proposed by Jackendoff (1977), Hornstein and Lightfoot
(1981), and Radford (1988), one is treated as an N′ substitute, which requires an
N′ antecedent. Another approach (Llombart-Huesca 2002; Alexiadou and Gengel
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2011), proposes that one is actually the spell-out of the Number Phrase head in
constructions involving NPE. I will tackle this last view in §4.2.3 below. As already
mentioned, I will argue here that one is actually a ContrA of category N, contrary
to both of these views. I will briefly introduce these other views here, before turning
to my approach.
The arguments in favor of the N′ substitute approach are based on the type
of modifiers which can occur with one.
For instance, assuming the following nominal structures involving postmodi-
fiers, as discussed by Radford:
(199) a. [N ′′a[N ′ [N ′ [N student] of Physics] with long hair]]
b. [N ′′a[N ′ [N student] of Physics]]
(200) a. [N ′′a[N ′ [N ′ [N student]] with long hair]]
b. [N ′′a[N ′ [N student]]]
The key claim is that whenever an N shows up modified by adjuncts alone
(with long hair), it should be possible to refer back to the noun without carrying
over the adjunct, as the noun appears alone in an N-bar constituent. The following
examples seek to verify this claim:
(201) a. The [student] with short hair is dating the one with long hair.
b. This [student] works harder than that one.
In (a), the antecedent appears with an adjunct postmodifier, and can be re-
sumed by one to the exclusion of this modifier. In (b), the noun shows up without
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any modifier and can also be resumed by one, suggesting, when one buys the as-
sumption that one requires an N-bar antecedent, that a bar level is present which
contains only the noun in the structure this student.
Following this, Radford claims that the noun does not appear on its own when
followed by a complement-type modifier like of Physics ; hence cannot be resumed
by one:
(202) a. Which [student] were you referring to? *The one of Physics with long
hair?
b. * The [student] of chemistry was older than the one of Physics.
(Lightfoot (1982), p.54)
Finally, Radford uses one as a diagnostic for the other suggested bar con-
stituents in the following examples:
(203) a. Which [student of Physics]? The one with long hair?
b. Which [student of Physics with long hair]? This one?
c. Which [student of Physics]? That one?
d. Which [student with long hair]? This one?
Turning to nominal premodifiers, Radford suggests that they can be of two
kinds; complements and adjuncts (attributes in his terms). He proposes the follow-
ing structure for the phrase a Cambridge Physics student :
(204) [N ′′a[N ′Cambridge[N ′Physics[N student]]]]
And uses one as a diagnostic for this structure:
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(205) a. Which [Physics student]? The Cambridge one?
b. Which [Cambridge Physics student]? This one?
c. Which [student]? *The Cambridge Physics one?
The example in (b) is intended to verify that the constituent Cambridge Physics
student is indeed an N’ constituent. The (c) example is meant to show that Physics
is a complement type premodifier; where one stands for an N’ constituent which
cannot be modified by a complement.
With this traditional treatment of one in mind, I will now turn to my own
approach. I will first discuss the its semantic properties, and then turn to its syntax.
4.2 Semantic Properties of one
4.2.1 Anaphoric Reach
Just as in the case of PartE, the anaphoric behavior of ContrA is not what we would
expect if it involved NPE, or if it was an N’ substitute. For one, it behaves as a
deep anaphor, and not as a surface one, (206).
(206) [While pointing at a unicorn.]
a. A pink one bit me yesterday.
b. Pink ones bit me yesterday.
Another interesting generalization pertains to its behavior in contexts involv-
ing several referents. There, just as for PartE, ContrA has a more limited reach
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than we would expect under the alternative approach.2
(207) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [The tall ones] sat down.
Can mean ‘the tall Zs’, or ‘the tall X ∪ Y ∪ Zs’
Cannot mean ‘the tall X ∪ Zs’
c. [The tall boys] sat down.
Can mean ‘the tall X ∪ Z’
Cannot mean ‘the tall Zs’.
Here, this cannot be substitution, the overt equivalent of the NPE, or N’-ellipsis,
of boys. If it were substitution, we would expect the anaphoric reference to be to
all the boys present in the context. Yet this is not the reading we find. one picks
up as antecedent the most salient reference set introduced in the context, namely
Z in this context, or the set of all available referents in the context. This is what
leads me to treat ContrA as an anaphoric pro-noun, and not a straightforward case
of deletion or substitution. I thus treat it as involving a contextual variable ranging
over reference sets, just as proposed for the plural pronouns in cases of PartE.
(208) J oneN K = X, where X is a contextually salient referent set
However, ContrA exhibits different semantic and syntactic restrictions from
PartE, as we will see below.
2I am grateful to Uli Sauerland for bringing this fact to light.
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‘the tall ones sat down.’
Can refer to ‘the tall Zs’, or ‘the tall X ∪ Y ∪ Zs’
Cannot refer to ‘the tall X ∪ Zs’
This is in accord with treating this expression as the covert counterpart to
English ContrA. This covert anaphor in French is also a deep anaphor, as is made
clear by the acceptability of the examples in (210).





























‘Pink ones bit me yesterday.’
4.2.1.1 Reference Set vs. Maximal Set
Just as it is the case with plural pronouns, ContrA can be anaphoric to the reference
set and the maximal set of an antecedent QP.3 This distinction is unexpected under
a formal account where one stands for an elided noun phrase, or is substitute for
an N’ constituent.
Nouwen (2003; p.58) argues that anaphoric reference to the maximal set intro-
duced by an antecedent QP is only possible with strong quantifiers.4 Interestingly,
the quantifier some can be used both as a strong and a weak quantifier. One way
to distinguish between these uses (Milsark 1974) is that only strong noun phrases
can be combined with individual-level predicates (predicates expressing properties
inherent to individuals).
(211) a. SOME students are intelligent.
b. Some students came to my office.
Another way to distinguish between strong and weak uses pertains to the
stress assignment. In (211a), stress falls on the determiner some, and the sentence
3In Generalized Quantifier Theory, for an expression Q(A)(B), the reference set is the set veri-
fying the quantificational statement, e.g. A∩B; whereas the maximal set is the set corresponding
to the restriction of the quantifier, e.g. A.
4The traditional test for weak noun phrases (Milsark 1974) is whether they can occur in there-
existential sentences: There are four/a few/many/few/no/*most/*all/*the boys in the room.
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implies a contrast between students already salient in the discourse context. This
is the strong use of some. In (211b), if the sentence is uttered discourse initially,
the QP can be used to introduce a group of students to the context, in which
case the stress falls on the NP students; e.g. the weak use of some. Nouwen then
uses this diagnostic to establish that only strong quantifiers can make the maximal
set available for subsequent anaphoric reference. Consider the following examples,
involving the anaphoric expression the others.
(212) a. Some STUDENTS came to my office. # The others didn’t bother.
b. SOME students came to my office. The others didn’t bother.
In (212a), we have the weak version of some students, consequently only the
reference set, the students who visited the office, is available for subsequent reference,
and the second sentence leads to a contradiction. This is not so for (212b), where
the strong use of some students introduces the maximal set to the discourse.
Turning to ContrA, the same pattern obtains:
(213) a. Some STUDENTS came to my office. # The tall ones didn’t bother.
b. SOME students came to my office. The tall ones didn’t bother.
This fact is in line with the proposal that one, just as plural pronouns, is
anaphoric to sets salient in the context. A theory which holds that one is anaphoric
to an NP, or an N’ constituent predicts no such contrast here.
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4.2.2 To Count as one
It was noted early on by Baker (1978) that nominal one is a count noun. As such,
it cannot be anaphoric to a mass term, unlike its pronoun counterpart. This can be
seen in (214). In (215), we see that the same holds for ContrA in French.
(214) Water surrounds the planet.
L’eau recouvre la planète.
English
a. It is required for life to subsist.
b. *A/The good one is required for life to subsist.
c. *A/The good one that is fresh is required for life to subsist.
(215) French
a. Elle est requise pour que la vie subsiste.
b. *Une/La bonne one est requise pour que la vie subsiste.
c. *Une/La bonne one qui est fraiche est requise pour que la vie subsiste.
In (214a), we see that a typical third person singular pronoun can accommodate a
mass antecedent. Examples (214b-c) demonstrate that one does not in fact allow
for such an antecedent.
In addition, it can appear with plural and singular marking, cardinal numerals,
as well as determiner such as these. All typical traits of count nouns.5 When it has a
count antecedent however, it appears syntactically, just like count terms and unlike
5See Gillon 1992 for discussion.
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mass terms, both in the singular and the plural when preceded by an article or a
numeral; but only in the plural when bare:
(216) Bill dropped books by the office.
a. Mary grabbed the interesting one.
b. Mary grabbed the interesting ones.
c. * Mary grabbed interesting one.
d. Mary grabbed interesting ones.
Further it accommodates many and few :
(217) How many dots did you see?
a. I don’t know, I’ve seen many blue ones.
b. I don’t know, I’ve seen few red ones.
For these reasons, I will treat one as being marked as count, which I take to
be a syntactic and semantic property of nouns.
Here, I also want to point out that, just as it was the case for PartE, Con-
trA cannot refer back to an event implied by an antecedent sentence (218a). This
contrasts with cases involving an anaphoric definite description headed by the cor-
responding event nominal as in (218b).
(218) John hit the blackboard, and then he hit the table
a. # The first One was louder.
b. The first hit was louder.
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Note further that, again just as it was the case for PartE, ContrA can resume
an event introduced by an event nominal.
(219) Marcus Aurelius witnessed the destruction of the city.
a. A much more gruesome one had taken place a century earlier.
I come back to this issue in detail in the next chapter, but foreshadowing, I
want to state here that this impossibility of ContrA to resume implicit event is tied
to its count requirement. As we will see, anaphoric reference to implicit events is
simply incompatible with features such as count, but also other φ-features such as
gender in French. Given that ContrA is specified as count, just like plural pronouns,
it cannot be used to resume such events.
4.2.3 one’s Contrastive Posse
At first glance, it appears that the pro-noun one must be accompanied by a modifier.
(220) John dropped books by the office.
a. # Bill took some ones from the pile.
b. Bill took some good ones from the pile.
(221) a. Bill took some books from the pile.
b. Bill took some good books from the pile.
(222) a. Bill took some of them from the pile.
b. * Bill took some good of them from the pile.
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In (220), we see that ContrA is unacceptable without the presence of an adjectival
modifier. This contrasts with the overt nominal, books in this case, which can occur
with or without a modifier in the same context, (221). This behavior is also distinct
from instances of PartE which simply do not take a modifier, as seen before and
repeated in (222).
Two explanations can be taken to account for this requirement; one pragmatic,
the other formal. The pragmatic approach holds that this requirement does not in
fact pertain to the modifiers per se, but rather is due to the fact that anaphoric
uses of nominal one require that a contrast be established between the referent of
one and other entities in the antecedent set. In other words, one can only occur
in environments which can support a contrast. The formal approach holds that the
presence of the modifiers bleeds the use of ellipsis, leading to the one-anaphora
strategy; I know of two different versions of this formal approach, to which I will
come back below. But first, I present arguments in favor of the contrastive approach.
4.2.3.1 The Nature of the Modifier
In line with the idea that contrast is what matters to one, Llombart-Huesca (2002)
notes that the modifier licensing the use of one must be a restrictive modifier:
(223) Did you read the book?
a. Yes, I read the whole *one / book.
(Llombart-Huesca 2002, p.61)
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However, the issue with the example she provides might be that the context
does not allow for other occurrences of the same type, to be contrasted, given the use
of the singular definite the book. Nevertheless, it appears that, provided with a good
context, the use of one with a non-restrictive modifier still leads to degradation:
(224) Did you read the books?
a. ? Well, I read a whole one
b. ? Well, I read two whole ones
c. * Well, I read two ones
In (224a-b) the strings involving a non-restrictive modifier appear degraded; how-
ever, this degradation might not be as drastic as in examples where a modifier is
lacking altogether (224c). This restriction pertaining to the type of modifiers to be
used is consistent with the hypothesis that the modifier requirement is due to the
contrastive nature of one. Non-restrictive modifiers like whole simply do not lead
to a narrowing of the sets being contrasted.
Expressives are another type of non-restrictive modifiers which fail to license
ContrA. Contrast the anaphoric use of the noun phrase thing in (225a), to the
infelicitous version involving one in (225b).
(225) I bought a toaster, but. . .
a. there was no instruction manual for the fuckin’ thing.
b. # there was no instruction manual for the fuckin’ one.
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Here again, the expressive does not allow for a partitioning of the antecedent set,
thus leading to infelicity.
4.2.3.2 How about these ones?
There are a few cases where one appears not to require a modifier. However, such
instances are cases where the context makes clear what the intended sets contrasted
are. For instance, one can be used without a modifier when figuring in a demonstra-
tive construction, where the contrast is indeed provided by context (e.g. a pointing
gesture)
(226) [While pointing at fruits at the market]
a. I want these ones.
In (226), the pointing gesture in the context renders the lack of modifier felicitous.
Notice that (226a) would be infelicitous if uttered in the absence of a pointing
gesture or any such indicator:
(227) [While standing in front of a variety of fruits at the market]
a. ?? I want these ones.
b. I want these green ones.
Without any modification, (227a) is unacceptable; however, adding a modifier to
the demonstrative construction in the same context (and assuming only a subset of
the fruits under consideration are green) yields an acceptable sentence.
Another instance where the nominal anaphor appears without a modifier is
when it stands as the head-noun of a wh-phrase:
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(228) [While standing in front of a variety of fruits at the market]
a. Which ones would you like, sir?
Nevertheless, I do not believe that such examples constitute any counter evi-
dence to the hypothesis that one requires a contrast to be made. As we have seen,
the demonstrative cases also require a partitioning, viz. one that can be provided
contextually. And the wh-cases are queries for such a partitioning.
4.2.3.3 one-deletion, one-support and complementarity
As seen in (220) and (222) above, repeated here, there is a complementarity between
one and ellipsis with respect to their taking modifiers.
(229) John dropped books by the office.
a. # Bill took some ones from the pile.
b. Bill took some good ones from the pile.
(230) a. Bill took some of them from the pile.
b. * Bill took some good of them from the pile.
Under the current approach, this is accounted for by treating one as an in-
stance of ContrA, requiring a contrast to be made; and ellipsis as an instance of
PartE, where the modifier simply cannot result from the derivation.
However, the early and influential approach of Ross (1967) provides a deriva-
tional explanation to this complementarity. Basically, one is present underlyingly,
and certain transformations, operations, can delete it in certain environments.
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(231) a. Mary bought two books on astronomy, and she read [both books on
astronomy] last night. (deep structure)
b. Mary bought two books on astronomy, and she read [both ones] last
night. (one pronominalization)
c. Mary bought two books on astronomy, and she read [both] last night.
(one’s deletion)
However, as pointed out by Jackendoff (1971; see also Perlmutter 1970 and
Sommerstein 1972), one clear issue with this approach is the fact that certain cases
would be derived from ungrammatical sources:
(232) a. I prefer Mary’s book to John’s.
b. * I prefer Mary’s book to John’s one.
Another approach to this complementarity is also found in the literature.
Llombart-Huesca (2002; see also Alexiadou and Gengel 2011) propose that one
is the spell-out of the Number Phrase (Ritter 1991). In effect, one appears as the
result of a last-resort operation, much of the sort often proposed for the auxiliary
do in English, in a configuration known as do-support (Chomsky 1955; Halle and
Marantz 1993; Bobaljik 1994; Lasnik 1995). Under this approach, one is intro-
duced in constructions where no noun or other appropriate head is present to bear
the number marking introduced by Num.











In (233), Llombart-Huesca proposes that one appears to bear the morphology in-
troduced by Num0 , which could have been borne by the quantifier many, had the
modifier lazy not been present as an intervener. This type of last resort approach
thus requires the complementarity between one and ellipsis.
However, the assumed complementarity at the basis of such approaches does
not hold across the board. As we have just seen, in a few cases, one does not require
a modifier to be present. Those are environments which I have suggested already
encode the required notion of contrast. As it happens, these environments can also
accommodate ellipsis.
(234) [While standing in front of a variety of fruits at the market]
a. Which would you like, sir?
b. Which ones would you like, sir?
Another case where one and ellipsis appear in overlapping distribution is in
constructions involving superlative adjectives:
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(235) a. The tallest of them sat down.
b. The tallest one sat down.
Further, cases involving the definite determiner require a type of contrastive
modifier, however this modifier need not intervene between the determiner and one:
(236) a. The ones from Swabia sat down.
b. The ones that Brad loves best sat down.
These facts are incompatible with the approaches which take one and ellipsis
to be two sides of the same coin. However, they are totally compatible with the
approach proposed here where they are simply two different formal phenomena
which can overlap in distribution.
Here, I want to address another argument offered by Llombart-Huesca for
treating one and ellipsis on par. Both yield strict and sloppy readings. As originally
pointed out by Valois (1991), cases of ellipsis in DP allow for both strict and sloppy
readings:
(237) I saw Janet’s picture of her cat and Jack saw Julie’s.
(238) I saw Janet’s beautiful picture of her cat and Jack saw Julie’s ugly one.
This ambiguity is also found in cases of VP-ellipsis, and is usually assumed to
be symptomatic of elided constituents (see for instance Fiengo and May 1994 for
discussion).
(239) Kim likes her cat and Karl does too.
135
Given that both one and ellipsis in DPs allow for this ambiguity, Llombart-
Huesca suggests that this is consistent with both constructions involving the ellipsis
of an NP.
However, as pointed out by Merchant (2010), sloppy readings are found in a
number of constructions which cannot involve ellipsis, and even with pronouns, such
as in cases of paycheck pronouns:
(240) a. Ralph ate his ice-cream with a spoon, and Seymour did the same
thing.
b. Harvey stubbed his toe on the doorstop,and it happened to Max, too.
c. Undergraduates can be covered under their parents health plans if de-
sired; { likewise for graduate students./ that goes for grad students,
too. }
d. A professor who pays down her mortgage with her paycheck is wiser
than one who gambles it away in online poker.
In conclusion, the complementarity in distribution between one and ellipsis is
only apparent. They actually overlap in distribution, which is compatible with the
proposal that they are distinct reference-anaphoric phenomena; namely instances of
ContrA and PartE.
4.3 The Syntax of one
For concreteness, I adopt here the syntactic analysis proposed by Corver and van
Koppen (2009) for this construction in a number of languages (Afrikaans, Frisian,
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Dutch, English French,. . . ):
(241) Underlying Structures:
a. French: [DP Les [FocP grands [NumP [NP ONEs ] ] ] ]
b. English: [DP Many [FocP tall [NumP [NP ones ] ] ] ]
In these constructions, the modifier moves to the focus phrase projection, where it
supplies the basis for the contrast established. Further, the use of the overt or covert
one is licensed by the presence of the focus projection.
Under this syntactic analysis, one is a noun, of syntactic category N. As men-
tioned at the outset, this is different from most previous analyses, which typically
assume that one is of syntactic category N′. Researchers have been drawn to the
N′ analysis because of what I call the ‘No-complement generalization’; that is, one
is not compatible with complements typically combinable with head nouns. I now
turn to this issue.
4.3.1 The No-complement Generalization
Under the substitution account (Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981; Radford 1989) it
is often assumed that one, being of category N’, does not allow for complements,
because such constituents are sister to X0 constituents. This ban on complements
does not come out straightforwardly under the syntactic treatment adopted here,
where one is a nominal head, N0 .
(242) a. * The students of physics are taller than the ones of chemistry.
b. The students from physics are taller than the ones from chemistry.
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This generalization is not however incompatible with the proposed syntax, as
already argued by Panagiotidis (2003). While arguing for an N0 status for nominal
one, he points out an observation made by Radford (1989) and Speas (1990; at-
tributed there to Lisa Travis). The observation pertains to certain modifiers which
appear to be complements, and yet are felicitous as modifiers of one:
(243) a. * The students of physics are taller than the ones of chemistry.
b. The portrait of the Queen is lower than the one of the vice-chancellor.
c. The ones from New York are taller than the students from New Jersey.
(Panagiotidis 2003)
Panagiotidis’ suggestion with respect to the examples in (243) is that we are
faced with two types of propositions; thematic ones (243b-c) and non-thematic ones
(243a). What is then particular with one is that, unlike typical common nouns,
it does not have a thematic role to offer. The noun chemistry in (243a) requires
thematic marking, but since neither the preposition, nor one can fulfill this role,
the string ends up being ungrammatical. On the other hand, the of in (243b), just
like the from in (243c) are thematic, and thus license their complements, allowing
the derivation to converge.
Panagiotidis further points out two other ways in which these two types of
prepositions may be distinguished.6 Prepositional phrases headed by a thematic
preposition can be extraposed (244a), whereas those headed by non-thematic prepo-
sitions cannot (244b):
6Originally used as diagnostics by Radford (1988).
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(244) Only thematic of -PPs can be extraposed.
a. Thematic: [A photo ] was found [of the vice-chancellor drinking
absinthe].
b. Nonthematic: *[A student ] was jailed [of chemistry].
(Panagiotidis 2003)
He also suggests that only non-thematic of -PPs have a prenominal counterpart
which is lacking a preposition:
(245) Only nonthematic of -PPs have a prenominal counterpart.
a. Thematic: a (*vice-chancellor) picture (of the vice-chancellor)
b. Nonthematic: a (chemistry) student (of chemistry)
(Panagiotidis 2003)
However, this behavior of thematic of -Phrases would be compatible with them
being adjuncts, not constituting in and of itself evidence for one as a lexical head,
but being consistent with it being N’. A further paradigm pertaining to extraction
might provide further support for this point. It is typically assumed that an asym-
metry holds between complements and adjuncts with respect to extraction; whereas
the former type of constituents allows for it, and the latter doesn’t. Consider the
following examples:
(246) a. What is this a picture of? [the corkboard in Howard’s office]
b. What is Hans a teacher of? [German]
c. What is this actually a criticism of? [LGB]
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d. What is this a portrait of? [The Queen]
(247) a. * What is this a picture on? [the corkboard in Howard’s office]
b. * What is Hans a teacher with? [brown hair]
c. * What is this actually a criticism in? [LGB]
The examples in (246) would thus be considered as complements under this view,
and the ones in (247) adjuncts. Then, we can also verify that the PPs with thematic
prepositions in (246) are in fact compatible with one:
(248) a. John likes the pictures of Mary, and Bill likes the ones of Sue.
b. ?? John admires the teachers of German, but Bill prefers the ones of
Marshallese.
c. The criticisms of Obama are much harsher than the ones of Bush.
d. The portrait of Colbert is closer to the toilets than the ones of Wash-
ington.
This leads us to the conclusion that one is indeed of syntactic type N0 , but
simply doesn’t have a thematic role to offer to its complement.
However, this argument is not without problems. For one thing, the putative
complement/adjunct asymmetry with respect to extraction does not appear to hold,
as it is possible to extract out of instrumental PPs at the VP level, phrases that are
adjuncts by any known measure:
(249) a. What did Hans cut the rope with ?
b. What did Stieg climb the wall with ?
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Taking away the evidence that would constitute the extraction facts, we are
then left with a set of paradigms that are consistent with the relevant PPs being
adjuncts (e.g. compatibility with one, and extraposition). Further, it is possible
to recursively stack those putative complements with adjuncts to the noun phrases.
Consider the following:
(250) John likes the pictures on the wall of Mary, and Bill likes the ones on the
table of Sue.
It thus seems to me that in most respects, those PPs behave more like adjuncts
than complements, and given the unreliability of the extraction test, we probably
better treat them as such. The non-thematic of -Phrases do in fact appear to be
complement, but this does not help us in deciding whether one can or cannot take
a complement.
Nevertheless, I will adopt Panagiotidis’ proposal that one cannot dispense
thematic roles, and I will go further and suggest that it does not subcategorize for a
complement either. I now turn to a paradigm in French which supports this stronger
position.
4.3.1.1 The French ones
Ronat (1977) discusses a number of cases involving relative clauses (RCs) in French,
which prima facie might be taken as problematic for the proposal put forth here,
namely that it exhibits ContrA just as English, but covertly.

















‘the one that is susceptible to please you’












‘the one that pleases you’
c. the one that is susceptible to please you
In (251a,b), we see that definite DPs involving only an RC, or a reduced RC, with
an empty noun (‘one’ under the current proposal). This contrasts with the English
case in (251c), where overt one is possible with the definite determiner and an
RC. Ronat offers the syntactic representations in (251a,b), and takes such cases to
support her proposal that in French, as opposed to English, N’ cannot be empty.
However, the syntactic analysis she assumes is incompatible with traditional
treatments of RCs in French. In particular, Vergnaud (1974) famously argued that
French RCs should be analyzed as involving raising of the head-noun from within
the RC. One striking argument in favor of this analysis pertains to the fact that,
in French, the Φ-features of the head-noun and its embedded counterpart must
match. To see this, consider the cases in (252), where a mismatch in gender leads
to infelicity; and the contrasting examples in (253), involving number marking.



















































































‘They are not the comedians that their father was.’
Further, these examples contrast with cases involving comparative deletion








































‘They are not the comedians that their father was.’
Going back to the cases in (251), it is clear that the structures assumed by
Ronat for French are incompatible with Vergnaud’s raising analysis. That is, the
RCs should be complement to the head noun. I assume the following syntactic
analysis:
















‘the one that is susceptible to please you’












‘the one that pleases you’
7Assuming the same conditions apply to matching in RCs and the locus of comparative deletion.
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As was just suggested above, one in English, and one in French, do not allow
for a complement. The unacceptability of the examples in (251) is thus predicted
under the ContrA analysis proposed here.
4.4 The Other Ones
In English, the expression one can be found under two different guises in anaphoric
constructions. On the one hand, we have nominal one which stands for an anaphor;
on the other, we have numeral one, which can be followed by an elided partitive
phrase, an instance of PartE.
(256) Nominal one:
a. John bought the magazines on Monday .
b. Mary read the long one on Tuesday.
(257) Numeral one:
a. John bought the magazines on Monday.
b. Mary read one on Tuesday.
In what follows, I provide a few diagnostics meant to ensure that we are dealing
with the right one.
4.4.1 One of them vs. The Ones
As a first distinguishing property I note that nominal one can be pluralized, whereas
the numeral one heading a PartE construction, being a numeral, cannot:
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(258) Mary dropped a pile of books at the office...
a. Bill took the most interesting ones.
b. Bill took the ones that Mary wanted.
c. Bill took two big ones.
d. * Bill took ones.
e. Bill took one of them.
Here, the examples (a) through (c) featuring pluralized versions of one are felicitous,
taking books as their antecedent; whereas the example in (d), featuring a pluralized
instantiation of numeral one is infelicitous.8 The example in (e) demonstrates that
numeral one followed by ellipsis is indeed felicitous in this environment.
As a second guideline towards distinguishing these two terms, I take it that
whenever one can be substituted by another numeral in a given context, then nu-
meral one can figure in this position. However, this doesn’t preclude nominal one
from also showing up in the same environment (e.g. compare (258b) to (259b)):
(259) a. Bill took the one/one that Mary wanted.
b. Bill took the two that Mary wanted.
c. Bill took the interesting one/?one that Mary wanted.
d. ? Bill took the interesting two that Mary wanted.
Comparing (259a) with both (258b) and (259b), we see that this environment is
available both to nominal one and numeral one. Comparing (259c) to (259d), we
8This construction could also have a different derivation where it involves one. This would be
unacceptable here due to the issues pertaining to contrast discussed above.
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(unsurprisingly) see that numeral one cannot be preceded by a prenominal modifier.
Another fact discussed above, which becomes helpful when contrasting these
two ones, is that Nominal one requires a modifier, or contrastive environment, when
it appears as argument to a determiner:
(260) Mary dropped a pile of books at the office...
a. Bill took an interesting one(s).
b. Bill took the one(s) that Mary wanted.
The fact that this is a requirement becomes obvious when the modifier is done
away with as in the following examples:
(261) Mary dropped a pile of books at the office.
a. ? Bill took the one.
b. ? Bill took a one.
Contrasting with this, numeral one cannot appear with a pre-nominal modifier,
although it can appear with a post-nominal modifier. When it appears with a post-
nominal modifier, it can be preceded by a definite determiner:
(262) Mary dropped a pile of books at the office.
a. * Bill took one interesting.
b. Bill took one that Mary wanted.
c. Bill took two that Mary wanted.
d. * Bill took the one interesting.
e. Bill took the one that Mary wanted.
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f. Bill took the two that Mary wanted.
Here we see in (a) that one cannot be followed by a pre-nominal modifier; whereas
the examples (b) and (c) demonstrate that the numeral can be followed by post-
nominal modifiers. The examples (d-f) demonstrate that the numeral can be pre-
ceded by a definite determiner, whilst taking post-nominal modifiers, but not pre-
nominal ones.
Thus, being careful to distinguish these two different beasts, I will go on,
focusing on nominal one.
4.4.2 Other Ones to Worry About
Halliday and Hasan (1976; henceforth H&H) offer one of the earliest and keenest
discussions of nominal one in the generative tradition. In their work, they point
out three other morphosyntactic elements showing up as ‘one’ which we want to
avoid confusing with one. Concluding this section is a brief survey of those three
possible impostors.
4.4.2.1 Personal Pronoun one
This is the ‘one’ in this one:
(263) One never knows what might happen.
(H&H 1976)
They note that this ‘one’ is never used anaphorically, but always exophorically,
a role that can also be played by the pronouns you and we. The environment in
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which it appears is inaccessible to the nominal substitute (e.g. bare singular).
4.4.2.2 Indefinite Article one
H&H identify this form as the form taken by the indefinite article [a, MG] when
it is functioning as Head of an elliptical nominal group (cf: Have one of mine!).
They further suggest that its plural counterpart is the weakened some (s’m) and
that together they form the class of non-specific determiners which distinguish
(count) singular/non-singular, with mass (grouped with the plural), as in a/one
house (count-singular), and some sugar, some houses (non-singular).
Here are some examples where these determiners are meant to be distinguish-
able from the use of the numeral as Head of an elliptical complex:
(264) Some
a. Are there lions in those hills? - Yes, we saw some on the way over.
b. I’d like some coffee. - Then make some.
(265) One
a. Are there lions in those hills? - Yes, we saw one on the way over.
b. I’d like some coffee. - Then make one.
(H&H 1976)
Where the suggested completions for the examples in (265) are a lion, a cup of
coffee, and not one lion, one cup of coffee.
Their status as indefinite determiner is further suggested by the fact that, just
as a, they are replaced by any in downward entailing environments:
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(266) a. We didn’t see any on the way.
b. ? We didn’t see one on the way.
(H&H 1976)
They however do note some negative environments where one can occur as
determiner, environments where a can also show up:
(267) ‘I vote the young lady tells us a story.’ ‘I’m afraid I don’t know one [a story,
MG],’ said Alice.
They offer the following classifications of what they call the definite and in-
definite determiners of English, on the basis of their phonological (tonic) behavior:
(268)
Selective form [salient] Article [non-salient]




one; some a/an; s’m one;some
(H&H 1976)
As briefly discussed above, they see the article one as endowed with the power
of nominal fusion (as in one with wheels); they suggest that in some cases the
determiner can co-occur with the substitute:
(269) a. I need a one with a sharp point.
b. There’s a one I hadn’t seen before.
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However, the native speakers I have questioned with respect to such cases find
them rather degraded. I am thus left uncertain with respect to the status of these
cases.
4.4.2.3 ‘Pro-Noun’ one
This ‘one’ is the one which they claim appears in the following constructions:
(270) a. If such a one be fit to govern, speak.
b. The ones she really loves are her grandparents.
(H&H 1976)
They suggest that this one can only have human referents, and as such is a
counterpart to thing.
(271) a. What does he need? The thing he needs is a passport.
b. What does he need? The thing he needs is his passport.
c. What does he need? The thing he needs is a lawyer.
d. Who does he need? The one/ones he needs is/are his lawyer/lawyers.
(H&H 1976)
As the reader can notice, this form also appears in the plural form as ones.
H&H claim that this form is mostly used in clauses displaying theme identifica-
tion. Take the following example:
(272) The children seemed to enjoy the outing. The one who didn’t was George.
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Here, one is ambiguous between the substitute and the ‘pro-noun’ form. However,
H&H claim that the substitute is cohesive (anaphoric for the present purposes),
whereas the ‘pro-noun’ isn’t; and so, in this example, two different readings are
available, one where George is of the children, the other where he is just a human,
perhaps a professor who’s not fond of candy. This second reading is taken to belong
to the ‘pro-noun’.
Note that if we do not hold that the referent of one must be supplied linguis-
tically, then perhaps they could be unified, the ‘pro-noun’ gaining a referent from
context.
This concludes our survey of the many potential ‘ones’ which we should be
careful to distinguish from ContrA.
4.5 Supporting the Distinction Between PartE and ContrA
Distributional support for the distinction between ContrA and PartE comes from


























‘I knew three/many of them.’
151
Following Kayne (1975) and Jones (1996),9 I assume that this clitic stands
for a prepositional phrase (PP) headed by the preposition de. The clitic can stand
for PPs with different meanings and different syntactic sources. The version of the
clitic we are interested in here is its partitive occurrence.10 Another version of the
clitic we will not be discussing here is its possessive, or sometimes called genitive,
instantiation. Various syntactic distinctions can be made between these versions
of the clitic, for instance, the partitive clitic cannot be extracted out of a subject
whereas the genitive clitic can, (274); further, the partitive clitic can ‘double’ , or




































































‘I do not know the structure of this poem.’
9But contra Sleeman 1996, who follows Cardinaletti and Giusti (1991)’s analysis of the Italian
counterpart to the French clitic, ne, which they analyze as being of category NP.
10Sometimes called quantitative, see Sleeman (1996) for some discussion of this possible
distinction.
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These differences between the two uses of the clitic are themselves a little
mysterious, and likely suggest that the syntax of the sources for the clitics, or the
processes through which the clitic obtains in either case is likely different. Estab-
lishing the source of such distinctions is beyond the goals of the current work.
Here, I will simply assume that the partitive clitic is the spell-out of a higher
copy of a moved partitive phrase, whether or not the lower partitive phrase is spelled
out or not (given 275a).





























































‘I knew three/many of them.’
From the contrast between (276a,b) we see that the partitive clitic ‘en’ must neces-
sarily be present when partitive ellipsis takes place. We can further see for (276c,d)
that the presence of the clitic is not required, although possible, when the parti-
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tive phrase is present overtly. Presumably, the clitic necessarily appears in cases of
ellipsis, and not optionally as in the overt cases, due to some form of interaction
between cliticization and a type of condition on retrievability.




















‘I prefer the red one’
Here, we see that the partitive clitic cannot occur at all in cases of ContrA. There is
thus a clear distinction between PartE and ContrA when it comes down to the use
of the partitive clitic in French; it is required (when it can raise/cliticize) in cases
of PartE, whereas it is forbidden in cases of ContrA.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that ContrA in English and French is an anaphor of
syntactic category N. It shares the same semantic representation as pronouns, but
also comes with the pragmatic requirement that it appears in a contrastive context.
There still remains a question as to why French and English differ in having
covert and overt versions of one respectively. I cannot offer an explanation of
this cross-linguistic distinction here, but am tempted to agree with Lobeck (1995)’s
suggestion that what matters here might be the overt morphological realization of
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A variety of nominal expressions can be used to make anaphoric reference to events
and other abstract entities (Vendler 1967, Asher 1993, Zucchi 1993, Hegarty et
al 2002, Hegarty 2003). Among them, event nominals (278a), personal pronouns
(278b) and demonstrative pronouns (278c).
(278) The Romans destroyed the city.
a. The destruction/Their destroying of the city was gruesome.
b. It was gruesome.
c. This was gruesome.
However, as we have seen in previous chapters, neither PartE (279) nor ContrA
(280) can make anaphoric reference to events implied by antecedent sentences:
(279) [While looking at an arguing couple]:
a. # [Some/Most/All ] always happen(s) right after Valentine’s day.
(280) John hit the blackboard, and then he hit the table
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a. # The first One was louder.
b. The first hit was louder.
I have claimed that in the case of PartE, this impossibility is tied to two facts.
First, only singular pronouns can refer back to implied events (Neale 1988).
(281) Bill stumbled and John stumbled. it/#they happened quickly.
And second, that count partitive phrases must be headed by a plural DP (Barker
1998).
(282) * Many of the boy
Turning to cases of ContrA, I have suggested that the incompatibility is due
to the fact that ContrA, unlike singular pronouns, is marked as count. This can
also be seen from the fact that it cannot have a mass antecedent:
(283) Water surrounds the planet.
a. It is required for life to subsist.
b. * A/The good one is required for life to subsist.
c. * A/The good one that is fresh is required for life to subsist.
Still, it remains a question as to why only singular pronouns or demonstra-
tives can resume implicit events anaphorically. This issue is further complicated by
a number of facts. First, events introduced to the discourse by means of nominal-
ization can be pluralized:
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(284) According to archeological findings, there would have been nine destructions
of Troy. Although not all of them are attributable to wars such as that
depicted in the Homeric tale, they were certainly all gruesome.
Second, although clausally introduced events cannot be simply resumed by
plural pronouns, expressions involving more descriptive content may do so:
(285) Bill stumbled and John stumbled. These events happened in the afternoon.
To the best of my knowledge, only one solution to this puzzle has been put
forth, which I will call the metaphysical solution. The proposal there is to treat
pluralities of clausally introduced events as singular sums, on par with mass terms
(Asher 1993, Moltmann 1997). However, Webber (1991) offers a different account of
event anaphora, which can also inform this issue. I dub this solution the discourse-
structure solution. Under Webber’s account, pronominal event anaphors actually
resume a discourse segment which is then taken to refer to events by means of
deferred reference. I adopt this treatment, and suggest that discourse segments
are simply not pluralizable. As we will see below, evidence from French shows
that event anaphors cannot bear any φ-features; plural, feminine or masculine.
This incompatibility with grammatical gender features cannot be explained by the
metaphysical approach, but is compatible with the discourse-structure solution.
This chapter is structured as follows: First, I discuss a number of assumptions
pertaining to event reference (§5.1), then, in §5.2, I discuss the metaphysical solution
and the discourse-structure solution.
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5.1 In Vendler’s Shadow
As mentioned above, Davidson (1967) argues that sentences are existential state-
ments about events, and that pronouns can refer back to such events.
(286) a. Jean hugged Marie
b. ∃e.Hugged(e) & Agent(e, Jean) & Patient(e,Marie)
c. It was sweet.
d. True ⇐⇒ ιe.[Hugged(e) & Agent(e, Jean) & Patient(e,Marie)]&Sweet(e)
Vendler (1967, 1968, 1975) further distinguished between two kinds of nominals
which may refer to abstract entities: Those he called perfect nominals and imperfect
nominals.
(287) a. the performance of the song (perfect)
b. the performing of the song (perfect)
c. his performing the song (imperfect)
Perfect nominals correspond to the two types derived NPs and ingof NPs ; the
imperfect nominals correspond to the gerundive nominals. The division between
perfect and imperfect is justified by a number of differences in the distributional
behavior of these noun phrases, namely with regards to nominal adjectives, articles,
auxiliaries, and adverbs:
(288) a. the/ a/ that performing/performance of the song
b. the beautiful performing/performance of the song
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c. * the having performed/performance of the song
d. * the performing/performance of the song beautifully
(289) a. * the/ a/ that performing the song
b. * his beautiful performing the song
c. his having performed the song
d. his performing the song beautifully
In Vendler’s terminology, perfect nominals can take determiners and nominal adjec-
tives, but not auxiliaries or adverbs. The opposite obtains with imperfect nominals.
He further notes that perfect nominals are compatible with certain predicates,
whereas imperfect nominals, just like that-clauses and fact-NPs, are not.
(290) a. John’s performing of the song was slow.
b. John’s performance of the song was slow
(291) a. John’s performing of the song was sudden.
b. John’s performance of the song was sudden.
(292) a. John’s performing of the song took a long time.
b. John’s performance of the song took a long time.
(293) a. # John’s performing the song was slow.
b. # That John performed the song was slow.
c. # The fact that John performed the song was slow.
(294) a. # John’s performing the song was sudden.
b. # That John performed the song was sudden.
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c. # The fact that John performed the song was sudden
(295) a. # John’s performing of the song took a long time.
b. # That John performed the song took a long time.
c. # The fact that John performed the song took a long time
Zucchi (1993) further highlights a number of meaning distinctions between
derived NPs, that-clauses, and fact-NPs.
(296) Mary remembers John’s arrival.
(297) Mary remembers that John arrived.
(298) Mary remembers the fact that John arrived.
In (296), it is necessary that Mary witnessed the event of John arriving. For in-
stance, one could not utter the sentence truthfully if someone had told Mary that
John arrived, without her being present at the moment of his arrival, despite her
remembering the fact. However, it need not be so for (297) and (298); in both of
these cases, the sentence might be uttered truthfully in the context just described.
Zucchi suggests that this might be due to the semantic identity of the different
arguments. More specifically, he suggests an ontological difference between (296)
and the contrasting cases; namely that the nominalized expression in (296) denotes
an event, whereas the following two cases denote true propositions (e.g. facts). Fur-
ther, (298) controls for the possibility that two meanings for remember are involved;
one which takes NPs as arguments, the other which takes clause. If this was the
case (298) should pattern with (296) and not with (297). The explanation thus
rely on the assumption that the state denoted by a verb like ‘remember’ is different
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when related to an event from when it is related to a proposition. That is, in order
to be in a remembering relation with an event, one must have witnessed the event
itself; whereas there are a variety of ways of becoming familiar with a proposition
(witnessing the event(s) reported by the proposition, reading about the proposition,
gossip. . . ), which in turn allows one to enter in a remembering relation with it.
To be sure that this isn’t an idiosyncratic property of the verb remember,
here are other predicates which behave similarly with propositional and eventish
arguments:
(299) a. John noticed Mary’s arrival.
b. John noticed that Mary arrived.
(300) a. John saw Mary’s arrival.
b. John saw that Mary arrived.
The reader can convince himself that a similar distinction holds in these cases.
Also, it is possible to get a similar contrast with the expressions of interest
appearing in the subject position. Consider the following:
(301) Mary’s resignation surprised us
(302) a. It surprised us that Mary resigned.
b. That Mary resigned surprised us.
c. The fact that Mary resigned surprised us.
In (301), it is possible that we knew in advance that Mary was going to resign, and
what surprised us is the way she did it. No such reading is available for any of
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the sentences in (302); in all of these cases, it ought to be the case that we weren’t
expecting Mary’s imminent resignation, and that the fact of it itself surprised us.
In this regard, events behave similarly to individuals:
(303) A: I had a meeting with Norbert today and he surprised me.
B: How so?
A: He was wearing a gorilla costume.
Putting aside the fact that Norbert wearing a gorilla costume is hardly sur-
prising, the point here is that the mere presence of an individual is not the only
thing that can surprise another individual, rather the entire array of properties that
can be held by an individual could potentially be surprise triggers. In other words,
certain predicates can be satisfied not only by individuals and events, but by some
properties held by them. Propositions appear to be different in these regards.
Zucchi and Asher propose, following Vendler, that, minimally, these facts
suggest that perfect nominals are event denoting, whereas imperfect nominals are
proposition denoting. The idea is that predicates like was slow semantically select
for events, thus accounting for the distribution seen from (290) to (295). Similarly,
the distribution observed in (288) and (289) could be attributed to selection for the
cases involving articles and nominal adjectives; that is, both of these would select
for individual or event denoting nouns, and crucially not for propositions. As for the
adverbs and auxiliaries, the difference could be attributed to the process of nomi-
nalization involved. More specifically, in the case of imperfect nominals, the subtree
which undergoes nominalization is larger, and can thus include such modifiers and
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functional projections, whereas this is not the case with perfect NPs taken to involve
the nominalization of a smaller structure.
Zucchi also points out that this proposal of Vendler’s, paired with the earlier
observations about predicates like surprise, makes further predictions:
(304) Mary’s performing of the song surprised us.
(305) Mary’s performing the song surprised us.
Since we take the nominalized expression in (304) to denote an event, just as
derived NPs do, we predict them to behave alike. This is indeed the case; (304)
would be true in a situation where we were expecting Mary to perform, but were
surprised by, say, the quality of her performance. No such reading is available for
(305); an expected result given the proposal that it denotes a proposition.
5.1.1 Taking Stock
As we have seen, following arguments of Davidson (1967), it is common to assume
that sentences denote existential statements about events. It is also common to
assume that these events can be resumed by anaphoric pronouns. Other nominal
expressions, such as nominalizations, have also been argued to denote such events,
and making an ontological distinction between individuals, events, and proposition
in our domain of entities has been argued for by Vendler and Zucchi.
However, if all such expressions, sentences, pronouns, event nominals, can
denote event individuals in the same way, what then accounts for the peculiar con-
straint on pronouns anaphoric to events introduced by sentences? In the next sec-
164
tion, I turn to two different possible account of this puzzle.
5.2 What To Do with These
As just mentioned, we are now left with a question: What accounts for the dis-
tinctions in acceptability between singular and plural event anaphora introduced
earlier:
(306) Three men raised the flag of the republic on three separate occasions during
the month.
a. This took the ruling junta by surprise.
b. This situation/*event took the ruling junta by surprise.
c. It took the ruling junta by surprise.
d. These events took the ruling junta by surprise.
e. # They took the ruling junta by surprise.
Numerous authors have taken such patterns to imply that events form singular
sums (Asher 1993, Lasersohn 1990, Schein 1993). Under some treatments (Asher
1993, Moltmann 1997), singular events are taken to be closed under summation, and
the event domain is treated as mass. This is the metaphysical solution introduced
above which I will first discuss before turning to my approach inspired by the work
of Webber (1988, 1991).
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5.2.1 The Metaphysical Solution
Moltmann (1997) considers the examples just mentioned and proposes that plural
anaphoric pronouns cannot be used because the “verbs (with respect to their event
argument position) are classified as mass expressions, rather than as singular count
or plural” (1997; 231). In arguing for this position, she points to the German
pronominal quantifiers which exhibit a differentiated mass-count distinction. These
quantifiers do not require a head noun, and take the mass form when quantifying
over events:
(307) Maria las Zeitung, schrieb Briefe, führte Telephongespräche un ärgerte
Hans. Alles/Vieles/Viel/Einiges/#Alle/#Viele/#Einige tat sie mit
Begeisterung.
‘Mary read the newspaper, wrote letters, made phone calls, and bothered
John. She did all (mass)/many (mass)/much/several(mass)/all (plur.)/ many
(plur.) / several (plur.) with enthusiasm.’
However, here I wish to suggest that the reason why the quantifiers take the
mass form is simply because ‘mass-marking’ is the default marking, as argued by
Bale and Barner (2011) and related work.
I find the claim that events in such cases are to be thought of as mass, on par
with mass terms such as ‘water’. Whereas it is true that mass terms can be resumed
anaphorically by a singular pronoun:
(308) Brad drank a lot of beer, because he thinks it’s tasty.
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It is not the case however that a single pronoun can refer back to a plurality of
different mass terms introduce in prior discourse, in the way that a singular pronoun
can refer back to an apparent plurality of antecedent events. Compare (309a) to
(309b).
(309) a. John stumbled and then Bill slipped. Mary thought it was funny.
b. # Brad drank beer and Sue drank milk. Maud thought it was tasty.
Furthermore, as we have seen above, whereas PartE can have a mass an-
tecedent in some cases, it cannot have an event antecedent:
(310) a. George gave me wine, and some of it was spilled on the white table-
cloth.
b. George spilled wine on the white tablecloth, and then Bill fell down
the stair. Some of it was funny.
For these reasons, I will now turn to the discourse-structure solution of Webber
(1991), which I adopt. I will then present further evidence from event anaphora in
French, which makes clear that the issue does not in fact pertain to the mass/count
distinction with respect to events, but rather to φ-features generally, and their in-
compatibility with reference to discourse segments.
5.2.2 The Discourse-Structure Solution
Webber (1991) proposes a different approach to event anaphora. She argues that
what the pronouns actually pick out are discourse segments, and that the reference
to events obtains by mean of deferred reference.
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In doing so, she considers complex discourses like the following.
(311) It’s always been presumed that when the glaciers receded, the area got very
hot. The Folsum men couldn’t adapt, and they died out. That’s what is
supposed to have happened. It’s the textbook dogma. But it’s wrong.
(312) Using microscopes and lasers and ultrasound, he removes tumors that are
intertwined with children’s brain stems and spinal cords. There is only
the most minute visual difference between the tumors and normal tissue.
Operations can last 12 hours or more. The tiniest slip can kill, paralyze or
leave a child mentally retarded. This is the easy part of his job. (New York
Times, 11 August 1990)
Such cases clearly involve several different events, which are introduced by different
sentences, and subsequently resumed together by the singular pronouns or demon-
stratives. Under Webber’s account this is because what is resumed is a single dis-
course segment, rather than a plurality or a mass of events.
In establishing that we are dealing with reference to discourse segments, Web-
ber presents the following discourse segment.
(313) a. For his part in their joint project, John built a two-armed robot.
b. He had learned about robotics in CSE391.
c. For her part, Mary taught it to play the saxophone.
Given this segment, she points out that it is easy to come up with a subsequent
sentence in which the referent of that derives from the immediately previous clause,
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(313c), or a subsequent sentence where the referent of that derives from the previous
three clauses, (313a-c):
(314) a. That took her six months.
b. That earned them both As.
However, it does not seem possible to produce a follow-up sentence where the
reference of that derives solely from (313b-c). Webber takes it that this is due to
the fact that these two clauses are not treated as a unit, a discourse segment, in the
discourse at hand.
Webber proposes that discourse segments are recursive structures, where clauses
constitute the minimal segments. In combining segments, she proposes two different
types of operations attachment and adjunction. The nodes on the right frontiers of
these trees are said to be in focus, and accessible by later anaphors.
As I said at the outset, Webber proposes that event anaphora obtains by means
of deferred reference, where a referring function relates the demonstrata, discourse
segments here, to the intended referents, events.
Recall that the referring function, (315), maps demonstrata into intended ref-
erents.
(315) f: D → R
In (315), f is the referring function, D is the domain of the demonstrata and R, the
range of intended referents.
Consider now Webber’s example in (311), with the discourse segments num-
bered:
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(316) (1) It’s always been presumed that (2) when the glaciers receded, (3) the area
got very hot. (4) The Folsum men couldn’t adapt, and (5) they died out.
(6) That’s what is supposed to have happened. It’s the textbook dogma.
But it’s wrong.
In this example, at least four regions of the discourse are in focus when that
appears:
• the region associated with clause 5
• the region associated with clauses 4 and 5
• the region associated with clauses 2-5
• the region associated with clauses 1-5
And so the domain for the referring function is composed of their four “prox-
ies”. The range of the function is a subset of event tokens, as suggested by the
sentential context in which the anaphor appears; that is ‘things that can happen.’
Having discussed the basis for the discourse-structure solution, I now turn to
a further argument in its favor taken from event anaphora in French.
5.2.2.1 A Grammatical Edge
Broadening our focus to French, where third person singular pronouns are marked
for grammatical gender (317a), we find that only demonstrative pronouns can be
used to make reference to events (317b). It thus seems that implicitly referred events,
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Note further that in French, just as in English, derived nominals like destruction
are also possible. These derived nominals participate in the gender system of the
language, like all other nominals, and can be resumed by an anaphoric pronoun























‘Marcus Aurelius saw the destruction of the temple. It was horrible.’
However, when such events are introduced to the discourse not by mean of
nominalized expressions, but implicitly, here again only a demonstrative devoid of



















‘The barbarians have destroyed the temple. It was horrible.’
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This pattern makes sense under the discourse-structure approach. Given that
discourse segments are what is actually referred to, and that such grammatical
structure do not bear φ-features, the fact that gender features or number features
cannot be attributed to them is sensible. This is why only expressions devoid of
such φ-features, it and the singular (qua unmarked) demonstratives in French and
English, can make anaphoric reference to events. ContrA and PartE, which are in
effect marked for count, cannot.
It is hard for me to see how the metaphysical solution could account for this
French generalization. No one would seriously hold that grammatical gender corre-
lates with some aspect of our ontological structures: Why should it be that a rifle
is feminine in French, and a pistol masculine?
5.3 Conclusion
I started this chapter with a puzzle pertaining to event anaphora: Why can implicit
events only be resumed by singular pronouns? The answer I proposed to this ques-
tion, following Webber (1991), is that event anaphora in such cases actually involves
deferred reference, where the actual referent is a discourse segment. Discourse seg-
ments cannot be marked by grammatical features such as number, and gender in
languages like French. This solution to the problem contrasts with a metaphysi-
cal approach, which states that events are ‘mass’, and so can only be resumed by
singular pronouns.
Still, this leaves us with a new problem for the generally accepted Neo-Davidsonian
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semantic. As we have seen, following Davidson (1967), affirmative sentences are
commonly taken as existential statements about events. Advocates of this view add
events to our natural language ontology. What then is different between individuals
and events, such that the ones can be resumed directly by anaphoric pronouns, but




In this dissertation, I have argued that pronouns, PartE and ContrA all have the
same representational basis for anaphora; namely a set variable in the semantics.
In the case of pronouns, I argued against syntactic D-type approaches (El-
bourne 2005) and semantic D-type approaches (Cooper 1979). Instead, I presented
arguments in favor of the set variable representation assumed under Nouwen (2003)’s
approach. Following this, I considered a number of cases usually taken to involve
the elision of a noun phrase, and argued that instead they involve the deletion of a
partitive phrase containing an anaphoric plural pronoun. Third, I discussed to the
contrastive anaphor ‘one’ and its null counterpart in French. Here again, I argued
that the basis for anaphora is a semantic set variable, where this anaphor differs
from pronouns in being of category N rather than D, and in having a pragmatic
requirement for contrast. This analysis differs from previous ones which hold that
this expression is a syntactic substitute of category N′, or the spell-out of the head
of a number phrase followed by ellipsis of a noun phrase.
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Finally, I discussed the phenomenon of event anaphora. Given the phe-
nomenon’s interaction with the anaphors discussed prior in the dissertation, and
the impossibility to refer back to events with expressions bearing φ-features, I ar-
gued that it is better seen as a case of deferred reference to an event on the basis
of anaphoric reference to a discourse segment, following Webber (1991). This con-
trasts with what I called metaphysical approaches, which hold that the anaphor
directly resumes an event introduced to the context by a previous clause (Asher
1993; Moltmann 1997).
6.1 What It Was All About
In concluding, I will summarize the various proposals and arguments presented
throughout this work.
6.1.1 Pronouns
I discussed various uses of pronouns and compared two families of theories which
could account for the interpretations possible. I focused on their semantic represen-
tation. I presented arguments against D-type theories, and in favor of the standard
representation of pronouns as variables, as typically assumed under dynamic theo-
ries.
(320) a. Syntax: [DP itD ]
b. Semantic: X
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The arguments against syntactic D-type theories were based on the cases of
event anaphora, deep anaphora and singular pronouns with split antecedents.
(321) John was shot on the street in broad daylight in NYC. It would have
never happened to Marie in Paris.
(322) [Waving a travel form to a university employee:]
Where do people usually submit it?
(323) Whenever Mary sees a horse or a donkey, she waves at it.
The arguments against all D-type theories, syntactic and semantic, involved
contexts with several discourse referents which meet the same description, and cases
involving predicational and specificational antecedent copular sentences.
(324) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [They] sat down.
Can refer to [Z], or [X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot refer to [X ∪ Z]
c. [The boys] sat down.
Can refer to ‘The X ∪ Z’
(325) a. This afternoon the manager is John, who is always super nice.
But last night I got into a fight with #him [=the manager], since he
was being completely unreasonable.
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b. He is the president of the U.S. # Come next election, he will be a
Republican.
Rather, as already mentioned, I suggested that the traditional semantic vari-
able representation was a better fit, than the D-type idea. Theories, such as D-type,
which hold that what is missing is a predicate, or NP meaning, have been presented
with several challenges. Perhaps it would ultimately be possible to correctly con-
strain such theories to capture the facts more appropriately. But the exact way
to do this is illusive, given that the account both under-predicts and over-predicts
readings.
I then turned to two different types of anaphors, PartE and ContrA, which
are typically taken to require an NP meaning. Rather, I suggested that in both
such cases, the anaphoric representation traditionally offered for pronouns is better
suited there as well.
6.1.2 Partitive Ellipsis
Turning to a number of cases generally taken to involve NPE, I have argued that
they actually involved the deletion of a partitive phrase containing an anaphoric
pronoun.
(326) Ten boys walked in the room.
a. Many boys sat down.
b. Many of them sat down.
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The arguments in favor of this view involved first anaphora, (327), and the
syntactic distribution of ellipsis, (328).
(327) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [Many ] sat down.
Can mean [Many Z], or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
c. = [Many of them] sat down.
Can mean [Many Z], or [Many X ∪ Y ∪ Z]
Cannot mean [Many X ∪ Z]
d. 6= Many boys sat down.
Can only mean [Many X ∪ Z]
(328) A group of boys walked in the room.
a. ELD
[Most/Each/Some/One/All/Many/Few/Both ] sat down.
b. Non-ELD
*[Every/The/A/No ] sat down.
A further argument was drawn from a subset of determiners in French which




























‘Few boys sat down.’
Another argument was presented on the basis of the impossibility to get events
as antecedents with such cases of ellipsis.
(330) [While looking at an arguing couple]:
a. * [Some/Most/All ] always happen(s) right after Valentine’s day.
b. It always happens right after Valentine’s day.
I hope to have demonstrated that there is overwhelming evidence in favor of
a PartE account over an NPE approach.
In the end, a few cases, such as bare possessives, were shown to be recalcitrant
to the PartE analysis, however, I argued that in such cases, an NPE account was
not clearly the way to go either. Nevertheless, more work is needed to assess the
status of such cases appropriately.
6.1.3 Contrastive Anaphora
Turning to ContrA, I have argued that both the cases of one-anaphors in English,
and what I claimed to be its French null counterpart, were anaphors of syntactic
category N. There, the anaphoric component of the representation is a variable just
as in the case of plural anaphoric pronouns; e.g. it is resolved by a plurality of
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discourse referents, rather than an NP meaning.
There again, we have seen that in contexts involving several possible an-
tecedents, ContrA behaves like plural anaphoric pronouns.
(331) a. I arrived in class five minutes before the start.
There were boyscouts(X) and girlscouts(Y) standing at their desks.
Then, ten young boys(Z) walked in whistling.
b. [The tall ones] sat down.
Can refer to ‘the tall Zs’, or ‘the tall X ∪ Y ∪ Zs’
Cannot refer to ‘the tall X ∪ Zs’
c. [The tall boys] sat down.
Can refer to ‘the tall X ∪ Z’
Cannot refer to ‘the tall Zs’.
I further discussed a peculiar property of ContrA, namely that it must involve
a contrast. This is most obvious in a number of cases, where a pre-nominal modifier
must be present. I have suggested however that this phenomenon is better seen as
a pragmatic requirement, rather than a syntactic one, as previously proposed.
6.1.4 Event Anaphora
Turning to cases of event anaphora, I addressed two aspects of it in conjunction.
First, the fact that in English, only singular pronouns and demonstratives can re-
sume an implicit event. Then, the fact that ContrA, which is restricted as count,
cannot have implicit events as antecedent either. This is in conflict with the idea
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that events are introduced to the context by sentences, just as they are by event-
nominals. Why then can a plurality of such implicit events not be resumed by a
plural pronoun?
I have discussed two approaches to this question, one the metaphysical solu-
tion; the other, the discourse-structure solution.
The metaphysical solution holds that events are mass. This explains why they
cannot be referred to plurally. However, as we’ve seen, this view couldn’t readily
handle french cases, where the expression resuming the event in this case, cannot
be a pronoun marked for gender.
Instead, I adopted a suggestion of Webber (1991), the discourse-structure so-
lution, which involves deferred reference. The anaphoric reference of the pronoun
is to a discourse-segment, which cannot be marked for number or gender features.
The intended reference is to an event, or group of events.
6.2 What’s Next
Finally, a number of issues have arose in this work which open the door for further
investigation.
First, the proposals put forth here would gain a lot from a clearer characteriza-
tion of the type of pragmatic processes such as deferred reference, which have been
called upon both in cases of neontological pronouns and event anaphora. However,
as the growing literature on this type of issue makes clear (Nunberg 1979, 1995;
Ward 2000; Percus 2005), this will likely be the focus of very interesting future
181
work, and I hope that the few comments made in this work can contribute to it.
Another issue which deserves more research is the case of bare possessives.
Bare possessives are the poster child of NPE, and they do not lend themselves to
the PartE or ContrA accounts presented here. However, as we have seen, a number
of facts with respect to such cases do not accord with a simple NPE treatment
either. Could semantic ellipsis be what is at stake here? Hopefully, future work
will reveal more about such constructions, and the exact role they should play in
theorizing about anaphora.
Turning to ContrA, a more specific characterization of the contrastiveness
requirement is needed. Specifically, it remains puzzling under the pragmatic char-
acterization I have offered that a PRE-nominal modifier is required in most cases.
Finally, as I hope to have demonstrated, cross-linguistic comparison can be
very informative of phenomena such as event anaphora. More such work could def-
initely be informative with respect to this phenomenon. For instance, Wiltschko
(2001) demonstrates that gender marking is completely optional for independent
pronouns in Halkomelem, and only needed in case of disambiguation. Assuming
that event reference is indeed sensitive to this marking, we would predict that pro-
nouns not marked for gender can refer to events in Halkomelem, but not their
marked counterparts. The results of such investigation promise to be very informa-
tive with respect to the proper representation of anaphora: What is missing, and
what morphosyntactic markings can it possibly combine with?
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Groenendijk, Jeroen, and Martin Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic Predicate Logic.
Linguistics and Philosophy 14, 39-100.
Grosz, Barbara J., Candace L. Sidner. 1986. Attention, Intentions, and the
Structure of Discourse. Computational Linguistics, Volume 12, Number 3.
Grosz, Barbara J., Aravind Joshi and Scott Weinstein. 1995. Centering:
a framework for modelling the local coherence of discourse. Computational
Linguistics 21: 203-225.
Halle, Morris and Alec Marantz. 1993. Distributed Morphology and the Pieces
of Inection. In The View from Building 20: Essays in linguistics in honor of
Sylvain Bromberger, Samuel Jay Keyser and Kenneth Hale, eds., MIT Press,
111-176.
Halliday, M.A.K. and Ruqaiya Hasan. 1976. Cohesion in English. Longman:
London.
Hankamer, Jorge and Ivan Sag. 1976. Deep and surface anaphora. Linguistic
Inquiry 7, 391-426.
Haviland, S. and H. H. Clark. 1974. What’s New? Acquiring New Informa-
tion as a Process in Comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior 13: 512-521.
Heim, Irene. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases.
Doctoral dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Heim, Irene. 1983. On the projection problem for presuppositions. In Michael
Barlow, Dan P. Flickinger and Michael T. Wescoat, eds., Proceedings of the 2nd
West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, 114-125. Stanford: Stanford
University Linguistics Department.
Heim, Irene. 1990. E-type pronouns and donkey anaphora. Linguistics and
Philosophy 13, 137-177.
Heim, Irene. 1991. Artikel und Definitheit. In Arnim von Stechow and
Dieter Wunderlich, eds., Semantik. Ein internationales Handbuch der zeit-
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